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ABSTRACT
Economic Analysis of Public Policy with Respect to Interna¬
tional Trade; A Case Study of the U.S. Aerospace Industry
February,

1978

Myung-Gun Choo, B.A., University of San Francisco,
M.A., Syracuse University
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by:

Professor Sidney C.

Sufrin

International trade theory is based, in great part,
upon the assumption that comparative advantage both causes
and determines the pattern of international trade.

But is

comparative advantage really a cause of international trade,
or a result?

Or are international trade and comparative

advantage conceptions results of more basic factors?

Causa¬

lity flowing from comparative advantage to trade has usually
been taken for granted.

The significance of the direction

of causality can hardly be exaggerated,

since the future

patterns of international trade and the developmental stra¬
tegy of many economies depends upon it.

An economy with high technology - high unit value ex¬
ports is in a good position to improve the real income
level of its people,

since it can impute the rising produc¬

tion cost to its foreign customers.
of global protectionism,

exporting,

In the strange world
at a low price,

is an

unforgiveable sin, but charging an exorbitant price to
foreign customer is praised as ’’fair comDetition."

Under
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the circumstances, an economy devoting its limited resour¬
ces and manpower to the low technology - low unit value ex¬
port industries is headed for self-defeat.

Comparative advantage theory, however, directs an
economy to concentrate on industries it is relatively best
at.

This leads to a wider gap between developed economies

and developing ones by further reinforcing the present state
of comparative advantage.

This is the terms of trade.

What is correct to maintain the status quo in the interna¬
tional economy from a developed economy’s perspective, may
not be correct from a developing economy’s perspective.

If comparative advantage theory were the universal
guide,

the prewar U.S. would have been better off by re¬

maining a predominantly agricultural or at least a laborintensive economy indefinitely, while Britain concentrated
on technology-intensive industry such as the aircraft in¬
dustry.

But the U.S. aircraft industry took the opposite

course.

This defiance of the U.S. aircraft industry and

government, turned out to be the cornerstone of American
industrial leadership in the postwar period.

Again Europe

in the 1970’s took a similar action in the development of
the aerospace industry.

These situations do not comfort

with what comparative advantage theory directs.

The basic objective of this study is critically to ex-
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amine the export pattern of the U.S. aerospace industry in
light of international trade theory,

to show that the real

driving force of international trade is not comparative ad¬
vantage but the will of entrepreneurs and Government to ex¬
pand the market.

The result was improving productivity

and income levels.
The goals of industrial export, then, help fashion the
state of comparative advantage.
policy.

The mechanism is public

Comparative advantage seems to dictate the pattern

of international trade, but only on the surface.

In reality,

comparative advantage is a result of the interaction between
public policy and entrepreneurs'

adaptability to a changing

reality.

In a passive economy dominated by the trade of resour¬
ce intensive commodities,

comparative advantage seems espe¬

cially rigid and inherent.

But in the complex world we

live in today, the patterns of trade is also determined by
public policy.

Factor endowment, which was stressed so

much by the comparative advantage advocates, became less
significant.

A generally capital deficient economy,

for

instance, can have a capital-intensive industrial base by
concentrating its resources.

All these factors lead to the hypotheses of this study:
1.

Comparative advantage is not a factor which is
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vested and fixed;
2.

The state of comparative advantage is constantly
changed by the interaction of public policy and
the entrepreneurs'

adaptability to their changing

economic realitv;
3.

Comparative advantage is not a sufficient driving
force of international trade but a necessary fac¬
tor resulting from exogenous efforts;

4.

The active driving force of international trade
and the determinant of international trade pattern
are the wills of entrepreneurs and government to
improve the income and employment levels through
market expansion.

In this analysis, it is proven that the hypotheses put forth
are viable as far as the aerospace industries in the U.S.
and Europe are concerned.

Additional hypotheses are

suggested which are concerned with the gains of interna¬
tional trade through the effects on the patterns of trade
arising from government-incustry cooperation in efforts.
The hypotheses stress the particular differential effects
of government oolicv on orocucticn and trade decisions.
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CHAPTER I.
1.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

INTRODUCTION

It is said that who rules the sea rules the world.
This aphorism may not fit perfectly to the complex world we
live in today.

Nevertheless, what may be true today,

that one who rules "space" may rule the world.

is

This may be

the inevitable consequence of the fact that, in abstract
terms,

any living organism strives for ever expanding perip¬

hery of its existence by whatever avilable means.

The aero¬

space industry today provides one with the most advanced
means for this purpose in a physical sense.

The advancement of the use of energy and speed has dic¬
tated the destiny of civilization.

The Bronze civilization

had come to an end as the Hittite learned to forge iron swords
and European Feudalism disappeared as gunpowder was introduced
from China.

It is generally acknowledged that air superior¬

ity greatly influenced the outcome of World War II.

How¬

ever, we should not overlook the fact that the same iron and
gunpowder used in warfare were also used in factories and
quarries thus raising their productivity dramatically.

Mi¬

litary bombers modified to commercial jet transports did the
same thing by shrinking the globe into a fraction of what it
used to be.
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Aeronautical technology and nuclear energy are contem¬
porary versions of gunpowder and iron.

This is even more

so because their consequences are not local but global.
The advancement of aeronautical technology probably more
than anything else led Great Britain to abandon her policy
of isolationism and to join continental Europe.

This also

forced the United States to shift its traditional foreign
policy away from the Monroe Doctrine.

Furthermore, the

size of the industry, compounded with its enormous impact on
other industries, makes the understanding of its essence
salient in any policy-making process.

Even leaving out the military implication of the aero¬
space industry, the economic importance of it can hardly be
exaggerated.

To be specific,

industry sales of 28 billion

dollars in 1975 represent 5.4 per cent of sales of durable
goods, 2.6 per cent of manufacturing industry,
cent of gross national product.^"

and 1.9 per

But even more important

than the mere number is the qualitative aspect of the indus¬
try.

For instance, aerospace exports in 1975 reached a new

high of 7.8 billion dollars.

Due to the negligible size of

aerospace imports, the net favorable trade balance of the in¬
dustry is about 7 billion dollars.

This is equivalent to

73.4 per cent of the total U.S. trade balance which was 9.6
2
billion dollars in 1975.
Thus it becomes clear that the
strength of the dollar depends upon the performance of aero-
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space industry which is the single most important contributor
to the trade surplus.

Another aspect to look into is the quality of employ¬
ment.

Although the total employment of 942,000 is only a

fraction of the national work force of 84.1 million as of
1976,

the number of scientists and engineers working in re¬

search and development programs amounts to 18.7 per cent of
the national total of that group.

In the sixties, when both

the military services and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA.) reached exceptionally high levels of
research and development activity,

the industry employed as

man3/ as 30 per cent of all U.S. research scientists and engineers.
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Furthermore, by definition, research and develop¬

ment constantly reshape and expand the scope of our civiliza¬
tion.

For example, items ranging from microwave ovens to

supersonic transports, are the byproducts of the research and
development efforts of this industry.
Thus it is crucial to have sound high technology indus¬
tries such as the aerospace industry for any economy to be¬
come a truely viable one.

This is particularly so in a time

of global inflation since only an economy whose industries
have either strategic value or a dominant position in the
world market can improve the living standard of its people.
Energy, aerospace, and food industries would be at the top
of such a list.

What such industries have in common is
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that the elasticities of demand for their products are less
than in other industries.

Thus it is easier for these in¬

dustries to impute the rising production cost to their cus¬
tomers than it is in other industries.

Furthermore, an

economy with an export position in such industries can even
enhance the living standard of its people through raising
the prices of exports.

For instance,

the per capita income

of OPEC members was increased greatly by raising oil prices.
The U.S. aerospace industry also showed its outstanding abil¬
ity in recycling petrodollars after the oil crises.

However,

the U.S. aerospace industry did not always occupy a preferred
position.
ed position?

How did the aerospace industry attain its preferr¬
The process by which the U.S. aerospace indus¬

try came to occupy its current position in the world market
will be examined in this paper.

2.

OBJECTIVES OF STUDY

The basic objective of the study is to scrutinize the
export patterns of the U.S.
international trade theory.

aerospace industry in light of
The core of international trade

theory is based on the assumption that comparative advantage
is the driving force of international trade and the determin¬
ant of the international trade pattern.
this study, however,
1.

The hypotheses of

are:

Comparative advantage is not a factor which is vested
and fixed;
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2. The state of comparative advantage is constantly
changed by the interaction of the public-policy and
the entrepreneurs *

adaptability to their changing

economic reality;
3.

Comparative advantage is not a sufficient driving
force of international trade but a necessary factor
resulting from exogenous efforts;

4. The active driving force of international trade and
the determinant of international trade pattern are
the wills of entrepreneurs and government to improve
the income and employment levels through market ex¬
pansion .
In order to substantiate these hypotheses, the growth
of the industry during the last three quarters of a century
will be systematically analyzed in conjunction with U.S. pub¬
lic policy.

By doing so this study will investigate the

crucial role of the government in changing the state of com¬
parative advantage between the U.S. and British aerospace
industries.
i

The U.S.
aspects.

aerospace industry deserves attention in many

It is not only the provider of the physical means

of national defense, but also the largest contributor to the
net balance of trade as well as the largest employer of sci¬
entists and engineers.

Yet due to its unique composition

of business, military, technology,

and politics,

few students

6

have attempted to study this fascinating industry as a
whole.
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This may be due to the fact that science today

has become much too specialized to tackle the task of analyz¬
ing this complex structure of the twentieth century.

This

study examines the aerospace industry from the perspectives
of four distinctive factors which concurrently determine the
development of the aerospace industry: technology, military,
politics, and business.

Understanding the nature of the aerospace industry is
essential to a proper comprehension of it and its consequen¬
tial impact on the general economy:

First,

its product

line is largely determined by Government needs and require¬
ments which have been constantly changing in response to de¬
velopments in domestic and international relations.

It has

therefore been acutely subject to variations in national pol¬
icy and has simultaneously had to keep pace with a rapidly
changing technology.

Second,

the industry's products require continual ad¬

vances in performance,

thus constantly forcing the industry

to expand the frontier of its technology.

Consequently,

the industry draws the largest share of the country's pub¬
lic and private expenditures on research and development.
Thus, its impact on long-term growth in productivity through
spill-over effects and the national economy is incalculable.
Third,

due to the nature of its product,

(i.e. weapon
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systems) the industry's foreign activity is subject to gov¬
ernment regulation which is constantly changing.

In inter¬

national politics it is not unusual to see friends of the
past become enemies of today or vice versa.

Accordingly,

foreign trade policy regarding weapon systems is unpredic¬
table.

However, since any industry must keep a steady team

of scientists and engineers to seize a forthcoming opportun¬
ity, it is painful to follow this erratic guideline.

Finally, as the scale of a single project increases and
the number of projects becomes fewer, winning or losing a
single project becomes a matter of life or death for the com¬
pany involved.

Moreover, some projects may take seven to

ten years from design to production while ever-increasing
complexities require sophisticated system management.

Thus

aerospace companies are forced to do whatever is necessary
to secure contracts.

This inevitably brings about poli¬

tical factors in the course of development.

Such consider¬

ations make the aerospace industry suited not only to quan¬
titative analysis, but also to qualitative analysis.
The methodology of this study is mainly historical and
exploratory.

However, it is also concerned with suggesting

some hypotheses which make the theory of international trade
more consistent with reality and more explanatory of the
course of historic adjustment in international trade pat¬
tern.

In brief,

this is a study of business history dir-
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ected at examining the conceptual basis of international
trade.

3.

IMPLICATION OF STUDY

Up until World War II, the U.S. aircraft industry had
to appeal to the government for protection from the European
aircraft industry.

However, it emerged as the largest in¬

dustry in the world during the war.

Even after the war it

suffered from foreign challenge particularly from the Bri¬
tish aircraft industry.

Nevertheless,

it was able to over¬

come the technological gap and to dominate the world market
for the last three decades.

In this process of growth,

the supportive public policy of the various departments of
the U.S. government played a critical role.

Being both

customer and patron of the industry, the U.S. government -1
directed its destiny.

On the other hand,

the ineffective¬

ness and myopia of the British government, more than the
internal problems of British aircraft industry,

is blamed

for her loss of the prewar marketshare in the world market.^

As this is being written, however, the British air¬
craft industry is struggling to regain her old glory through
the transnational projects ardently promoted by various sets
of European countries.

Some of the well known collabora¬

tive projects are Concorde, Airbus, Jaguar, Multi Role Com¬
bat Aircraft(MRCA),

and Martel air-to-ground missile pro-
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jects.

Whatever the outcome may be,

this suggests that

the public policy in general is a crucial determinant of
the export pattern and the growth of the aerospace industry.
Although, this may not be the case of every industry, it is
likely to be true of any high technology-high value indus¬
try.

This observation may have a significant implication to
the developing economies and their developmental strategies,
since the comparative advantage theory has directed them to
concentrate on low technology - low value industries while
developed economies concentrate on high technology - high
value industries.
tries,

From the viewpoint of developing coun¬

this does nothing but reinforce the present foreign

trade patterns and thus further widen the gap between the
living standard of developed countries and that of develop¬
ing countries.
But our thesis is that the state of comparative advan¬
tage is only the result of many external factors,

and thus

it is changeable through various public policy.

This im¬

plies that an economy should not bind itself by the present
state of comparative advantage in trading with others for
comparative advantage is not the true cause of international
trade.

The true driving force of international trade is

the will to expand the size of the market,

thus raising the

productivity and income level of a concerned economy.

The
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state of comparative advantage is not vested or fixed as
the traditional school preaches but results from, and is
constantly changed by an active public policy.

The experience of the U.S.

aerospace industry substan¬

tiates the hypotheses of this study.

From predominantly

agricultural economy the U.S. aerospace industry emerged as
an economic giant of the twentieth century.

If the com¬

parative advantage advocates were right, the U.S. should
have remained as an agricultural economy due to its vast
fertile land, and weak high-technology intensive industrial
base.

But the U.S. was forced to develop its own with

strong governmental support due to the last two World Wars
and the subsequent Cold War with Soviet Russia.

This turns

out to be an indispensable asset for the U.S. in attaining
both economic and political leadership in the postwar era.
Thus the defiance to the traditional thought on international
trade offers an opportunity to examine the validity of the
hypotheses of this study.

4.

BACKGROUND OF STUDY
Since the first usable aircraft was made by the Wright

brothers in 1903 the progress of the aircraft industry has
been upward, but only sporadically so.

The first aircraft

company was established by the Wright brothers in 1909, but
was soon closed because of lack of demand.

Not until the
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outbreak of World War I was the strategic value of aircraft
recognized by the U.S,
self totally unprepared.
the U.S.

Consequently, the U.S. found it¬
There were no combat aircraft in

capable of surviving aerial battle for aircraft

were considered basically as a means of secondary transport
In the brief eighteen months of the war the U.S. tried des¬
perately to catch up with the technology of its European
counterparts.

However, its effort was unsuccessful.

Dis

ruption after the war made the mess even worse because of
slow commercial demand and the disposal of a huge military
surplus.

Consequently,

in the early 1920's, the industry

was struggling for a mere existence.

In 1925,

the Morrow Board appointed by President

Coolidge filed its report concerning the future of the air¬
craft industry and its effect on national security.

This

resulted in the Air Commerce Act, the Army Air Corps fiveyear program,

and Navy five-year program into existence.

The report also provided,

for the first time,

the basis of

a long term national air policy that brought a virtual re¬
birth to the industry.

Within a few years U.S.

were able to establish scores of world's records.
in 1934,

aircraft
But,

the industry was set back on its heels by the

abrupt cancellation of the federal air-mail contracts.
One scandal after another was featured by the mass media.
Everyone concerned was preoccupied with cautiousness while
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the industry became troubled and depressed.^

With the military procurement interrupted, the air¬
craft industry expanded its exports.

Toward the end of

the thirties exports amounted to 70 percent of the total
industry sales.
F.D.R.

Then came the Arms Embargo Act, of the

administration, which cut off export outlets and

again rocked the industry back on its heels.

g

Its recovery

did not occur until the president’s executive order permit¬
ting export was enacted.

Finally,

the Lend-Lease Act of 1941 cleared the way

for quantity exports to the Allies.

Production jumped

from 2,141 aircraft in 1939 to 6,086 in 1940 and to 19,290
q

in 1941.

Most of this production was for export.

For¬

eign demand helped the U.S. aircraft industry expand its
facilities and work-force,

and led to its mass-production

technology.
Therefore, in both wars aircraft exports preceded even¬
tual wartime production.

Fortunately, in both World Wars

the U.S. had time for mobilization and for correcting the
dificiencies in airframe production capacity.

However,

it

is generally acknowledged that there will be no time given
for gradual mobilization in the next war, due to the nature
of warfare and the vacuum of power left by the European
powers.

10
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For this reason, the U.S. government has realized that
it needs an active aircraft industry as much as a standing
Air Force.

The production phase is as essential as research

and development.

The military has also learned that new

weapons which are untested, underdeveloped, or only avail¬
able in small quantities, have little consequence in the
course of war.
fighter.
lies'

A good example of this was the German jet

German research teams were far ahead of the Al¬

counterpart in jet engine development and far ahead

of their production capability.
fighter, He-178,

However,

the first jet

came out too late and in too small a quan¬

tity to affect the course of World War II.

Had Germany’s

jet fighters been produced in a sufficient quantity in time,
the war might have taken a different course, or at least
would have been prolonged.
Two World Wars taught the U.S. government and military
three things:

First,

there is no substitute for time in

the research and development of a new aircraft.

And the

time required for development increases with the advancement
of technology.

Whereas the standard four-engined bomber

of 1940 required 150,000 man-hours of research and develop¬
ment,

the same type of Bomber in 1944 required 1.5 million

manhours.^

Accordingly, the time lag of development was

extended from four years on the average which it took during
World War II to the rate of eight years which it takes today.
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Second, quantity production is essential to effective
air power.

Only a sufficient number of aircraft can have

any strategic value, no matter how superior the aircrafts
are.

Of utmost concern, is the fact that mass production

requires a steady demand from the public sector for business
in time of peace.
Third, applied research and development requires a
great amount of time and money.

Therefore, it became ob¬

vious that the establishment of a long-range national re¬
search program must be integrated with the program of pro¬
duction.

This requires a special working relationship

among the government, the military,

scientists, and indus¬

try.

Unlike the attitude of the government after World War
I, the government now supported the development of the aero¬
space industry in every possible way after World War II.
The aggravation of the Cold War further enhanced its support
of the industry.

The government-industry relationship be¬

came more of a partnership than a customer-producer relation¬
ship.

Thus the military-industrial complex began to take

shape.^
The launching of the U.S.-Soviet space race in the
1950's and the increasing military reliance upon missiles
shifted the structure of the industry.

A decisive conse¬

quence of the space race was a decrease in demand for mili-
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tary planes.

There was some compensating increase in the

output of civil aircraft and there were also exciting pros¬
pects in some other areas such as Vertical-Take-Off-and-Landing aircraft(VTOL), Short-Take-Off-and-Landing aircraft(STOL)
and urban transportation.

Nonetheless, military aircraft

had always constituted the largest segment of the industry's
business.

Thus when this dropped off, the industry had to

find an alternative.

Of the many alternatives, going into

missile production itself was the most feasible one.

How¬

ever, there is no compelling reason for missiles to be made
by the aircraft industry.

In some case electronic firms

were more qualified to do so.

Nevertheless, the aircraft

industry, by adapting a new requirement of technology and
the course of public policy, was successful in transforming
itself into the aerospace industry.
The introduction of the jet engine also altered the
market structure of the industry.

Boeing's successful mo¬

dification of the jet tanker, KC-135, into a commercial
transport put it in a formidable position.
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The jet

transport also had a profound impact on the laymen's concept
of the world as well as on Wall Street by adding dozens of
new glamour stocks in the airline business.

In 1968, the

industry reached a record prosperity due to the Vietnem War,
the ambitious space project, and the ever expanding commer¬
cial transport demand.

But the end of the Vietnam War and
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the reduction of the space program coupled with soft demand
in commercial transport and high inflation ignited by the
oil crisis hit the industry hard.

The aerospace industry adapted itself to a new situ¬
ation by expanding its export sector.

By definition, trade

deficit on one side means trade surplus on the other side.
Thus the oil crisis in the rest of world implies a record
surplus in the Organization of Petroleum Export Countries
(OPEC) members.
OPEC wanted most.

Aerospace products were precisely what
OPEC, with virtually unlimited financial

resources, soon became the best customers of the U.S.
space industry.

aero¬

In 1975, the aerospace exports reached a

new high of $7.8 billion with over $7 billion of net trade
balance.

This represents 73.4 percent of the net trade

balance of this country.^

But at this point another fac¬

tor that clouds the future of the industry must be consider¬
ed: the conflict of U.S. military and foreign policies with
foreign trade.
Behind the record of upsurge and downswing was the
industry’s unique monopsonistic character;

the U.S. govern¬

ment purchased over 60 percent of the total output.

This

industry heavily depends on the military procurement,

sub¬

ject to public policy.

Yet history reveals that the U.S.

had no consistent plan in peace time to maintain production
levels, except years ago when the Morrow Board program(1926-
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1931) was in effect.^

On top of this, the unique nature

of the industry as the producer of the most advanced weapon
systems makes it subject to a close regulation by public
policy in its foreign trade activities.

The federal government's contribution to the progress
of the industry is substantial.
funding was vitally

Research work with public

important in the advancement of aero¬

nautical science and technology.
ment,

Besides military procure¬

the expenditure of public funds for airports,

air

traffic control and navigational aides, and the promotion
of safety, economically stimulated the expansion of avia¬
tion and therefore of the industry.

Hence public policy

in both the military and foreign areas and entrepreneurs
adapting themselves to these policies control the general
pattern of progress in both domestic and foreign trade.
Comparative advantage in foreign trade may have resulted
from these activities, but not vice versa.
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CHAPTER II.

REVIEW CF LITERATURE

1. INTRODUCTION

International trade theory rests on attempts to explain
the causes and determinants of the natterns of international
-w

trade by comparative advantage.

But is comparative advan¬

tage really a cause or simply a result of international
trade?

Although many theorists seem to take causality

for granted,

the importance of considering the matter can

hardly be exaggerated since the future pattern of trade and
the developmental strategy of an economy will depend upon it
For instance if comparative advantage theor37 were cor¬
rect, the prewar U.S. would have been better off by remain¬
ing a predominantly agricultural economy indefinitely while
Britain concentrated on technology intensive industry such
as the aircraft industry.
World War II.

Indeed this was the case

When the war broke out,

until

the U.S. had to pro¬

duce British models to equip its own Air Force.

Numerous

patents and research data liberally sunnlied by Britain
were indispensable for the U.S.
pean aircraft industry.

in catching ud with the Euro

The only major advantage the U.S.

aircraft industry had was that it was located far away from
the bombing range of the Luftwaffe.

Equally important was

the fact that the U.S. government was willing to and was

able to, generate on unprecedented

mass demand of aircrafts

in order to win the war.

By the end of the World War II,

the U.S. aircraft in¬

dustry emerged as the largest manufacturing industry of the
world.

Yet, it was still lacking in quality, and was not

superior to the British aircraft industry.

The first com¬

mercial jet transport, Comet was developed by the British,
and Vickers and Arristrong were still dominating the postwar
world market.

The British aircraft industry was about four

years ahead of the U.S. in technology^ and many 3ritish
models such as the Canberra were adapted as production
models even after the war.
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The U.S. aircraft industry, however, had strong govern¬
ment support through a generous procurement policy which
was further expanded as the Cold War became intensified.
The technological base which was gained from military pro¬
curement was automatically transferred into the development
of commercial aviation.

This was culminated in Boeing's

successful modification of the jet tanker, KC 135, into
model 707.

Eventually,

the British aircraft industry was

forced to retreat from long range jet transport.

It was

to the advantage of the U.S. aerospace industry that it
started late,

for it was able to learn from the mistakes

which the British manufacturer had made.
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Gradually, the U.S. aerospace industry replaced the
British manufacturers in the world market.

The compara¬

tive advantage theory suggests that a country should rein¬
force the present patterns of foreign trade in order to be¬
nefit most from trade.

In reality, however,

comparative

advantage is a result rather than cause of trade.

It is

also local because the cost curve of any particular firm
may not be identical to the cost curve of an industry.
Thus it could be true that the most efficient firm in the
least efficient economy is more efficient than the most
efficient firm of the most efficient economy.
a firm's position in international market

Consequently,

is not necessarily

determined by the market position of the industry as a whole.
Comparative advantage is then not a national economic pheno¬
menon but a local phenomenon.

Other positive external factors such as government pro¬
curement policy and tax incentive more often than not affect
the conditions of production and demand.

New patterns of

foreign trade emerge as the result of these.

Therefore,

instead of a comparative advantage theory we propose a dy¬
namic externality theory.

Even if the comparative advan¬

tage theory may be useful in defending the vested interest
of the British aircraft industry, it is not useful in ex¬
plaining the behavior of a country which strives for catch¬
ing up with others as was the case of the U.S. in the 1940's.
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This dynamic externality theory may not apply to every
industry or every country but it certainly helps us under¬
stand the development strategy of the developing countries.
The development of high technology - high unit value indus¬
try is crucial to any economy for improving the living stand¬
ard of its people.

The traditional comparative advantage

theory directs us to obey the present pattern of foreign
trade, thus further reinforcing the state of comparative
advantage, and widening the income gap among countries.
The dynamic externality theory, however, indicates that com¬
parative advantage can be changed by public policy.

This purports to investigate the economic impact of
public policy upon the growth of a technology industry,
U.S. aerospace industry
theory.

in light of international trade

For this purpose,

the major theories of interna¬

tional trade will be critically reviewed.
of the U.S.

the

Then the growth

aerospace industry and the changing patterns of

foreign trade will be analyzed with respect to the U.S. pub¬
lic policies.
Even if every exporting country has a comparative ad¬
vantage over every importing countries for a specific pro¬
duct, it does not necessarily mean that comparative advan¬
tage caused the country to export that specific product.
It may well be the other way around, or that a third factor
which caused comparative advantage may have also caused ex-
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port.

For instance, since sun rays cause warm weather and

dark shadow,

there is a positive correlation between temper¬

ature and the intensity of the darkness of shadow.

But

this does not mean that higher temperature causes darker
shadows or vice versa.

In order to scrutinize this matter,

we need further intuitive observations of the phenomena.

From Ricardo

onward, most of the international trade

theorists have focused on the production and cost aspects
of international trade.
Ohlin theory

4

This culminated in the Heckscher-

which is effectively challenged by Leontief.

5

Since then many critiques and defenses have been exchanged
by the opponents and proponents of this theory.

Meanwhile,

many theorists have attempted to improve the traditional
model by expanding it in both space and time dimensions.
Yet all the attempts have been greatly hindered by poorly
defined variables and many unrealistic key assumptions.
In order to improve this theory, therefore, we need to ex¬
amine the relevance of the assumptions since the ultimate
value of a theory rests on its external relevance as well
as internal consistency.

At the same time, we need to

clarify precisely definitions of the variables.
Unfortunately, one of the most important aspects of in¬
ternational trade,

the income effect and other external fac¬

tors have been largely neglected by the traditional theor¬
ists.

The income effect is the effect of trade on the in-
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come expansion and accompanying multiplier-accelerator ef¬
fect, as well as the distribution of income.

In a sense,

the income effect of international trade is even more cru¬
cial than the specialization of production due to price ef¬
fect, because of its dynamic nature.

Thus the author ca-

tagorized all the previous significant studies under three
headings:

Protectionism, price theory, and income theory.

Some may think that this is a rather unusual classification
However, there is nothing sacrosanct about any classifica¬
tion.

Protectionism has never been acknowledged as a rigor¬
ous school.

Yet it has such an amazing staying power that

even today imposes a meaningful threat to the enhancement
of international welfare.

Also its argument has been con¬

stantly sharpened by an unceasing stream of patronized scho
lars.

Even as this is being written President Carter i3

being pressed by the steel and shoe industries and labor,
to cite a few, to restrict foreign imports.

Thus even

though many theorists fend protectionism to be an unfounded
theory, it is important to examine it critically.

The first true scientific approach to international
trade is price theory.

This can be traced back to Adam

Smith's absolute advantage theory.

This has evolved to

Ricardo’s well known comparative advantage theory, which
was actually first conceived by R. Torrens.^

This i3 fur-
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ther developed by Eeckscher, Oh I in, end SanteIson, but it
has still regained a price theory.

Its inability to ex¬

plain the international economic phenomena has led to con¬
siderable criticise:.

Idost of the criticises, however, are

1ini ted in their scope to the price and production sides of
international trade.

Thus sore people like, Wijnhclds"

lanented to the fact that

’too such tine has been already

wasted in patching up a theory which is faulty in its very
f our cation. ”

-T.e cntica- orttt orouer.t mere as m2 u" tore attentat
to the incone aspect of international trade.

Yet nest of

conterporary economists , who were brought up in an affluerr
society,

tend to take for granted this real driving force
■"'ace, water, nace tee present art usance

:ema*
tossit _e

nevertheless, nany,

consciously and unconscious¬

ly, wrote about incone effect and its duplication to the
national econonv.
Although incone theory explains the current internation¬
al trade pattern better than price theory it still lacks an
explanation of the active cause of it.
fact that it deals with the s
cause.

-nis is cue tc the

:s rather than tne setts.

A disease is not caused by high terperature but by

a pathogenic agent.

A high terperature is only one or tne
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would not always diagnosis correctly.

In the same fashion, we should look into any economic
phonemena in light of active causes rather than passive sym¬
ptoms.

In the real world,

the true actor is Man.

Conse¬

quently, his value system, mentality, physical dimension,
and social institution direct the destiny of the world he
lives in.

In the real world these could converge into pub¬

lic policies ranging from military policy to tax structure.
This study attempts to find the true driving force of inter¬
national trade in actors rather than in symptoms.

There¬

fore, it seems more appropriate to look into public policy
which is the social embodiment of Man himself.

2.

OVERVIEW

Most of the significant studies can be systematized in
the following format:
Table 1.

Theories of International Trade

Major Theories

Major Arthors
Jean Bodin (1530-96)
Jean Colbert (1619-83)
Mercantilism

Thomas Mun (1571-1641)
William Petty (1623-87)

Protectionism
Unemployment

Labor Unions all over the

Theory

world
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Major Theories

Major Arthors
Alexander Hamilton (1757-1804)

Protection-

Infant

isn

Industrv

Frdrick List (1789-1804)
3. Hildebrand (1812-1878)

Theorv

W. Roscher (1817-1894)

*

K. Knies

(1821-1898)

Absolute

Adam Smith (1723-1790)

Advantage

J.S. Mill (1806-1973)

R. Torrens

(1780-1864)

David Ricardo (1772-1333)
Comparative

David Hume (1711-1776)

Advantage

Francis Edgeworth (1845-1926)
Alfred Marshall (1842-1924)

Price
Theory

Eli Heckscher (1879-1952)
Bertil Ohlin (1932)
Factor-

Paul Samuelson (1941)

En do wizen ts

James Meade (1950)
Wassily Leontief (1953)

*

m

Taste

S.B. Linder (1961)

Economies

G.N. T. Hung (1968)

of Scale

Revised

Transpcr-

M. Beckman

Price

ration

Is are 6c Peck (1954)

Theory

Cctmeti-

H.G.. Johnson (1967)

—
W 4k.Ull

T

t-

P

i . w .

Travis

'1955'

^1956)

D. Reesing (1968)
Gruber

'156”)
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Major Theories

Major Arthors
Colin Clark (1938)
Roy Harrod (1939)
D.H. Robertson (1939)
Multiplier

L.A. Metzler (1942)

Accelerator

Fritz Machlup

Theory

Joan Robinson (1947)

(Real Side)

J.J. Polak (1947)
W.

(1943)

Stolper (1947)

Kenichi Miyazawa (1960)
Douglas North (1961)
C.P. Kindleberger (1961)
R.D. Wolff (1970)
Income
Theory

J.M. Keynes

(1929)

August Losch (1930)
Balance of

Fritz Machlup (1930)

Trade Theory

Arnold Harberler (1950)

(Monetary

S.S. Alexander (1952)

Side)

H.G. Johnson (1956)
Jan Tinbergen (1952)
Paul Ellsworth (1950)
A.J. Brown (1951)
Gottfried Kaberler (1949)

Terms of
Trade

R.E. Baldwin (1955)
W.M. Corden (1957)
Paul Prebisch (1963)
Murray Demp

(1956)

30

3. PROTECTIONISM

The progenitor of protectionism is mercantilism, which
is the label given to the doctrines of nationstate in the
period from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries.
This emphasizes the importance of the trade surplus in se¬
curing precious metals, which are regarded as essential to
national wealth and strength.

The essentials of this doctrine can be summarized in
the following manner.
1.

a trade policy should be framed and executed in
nationalistic scope;

2.

the assessment of a policy was based on the net
inflow of precious metals;

3.

policy goal was to secure the largest possible
trade surplus so that the quantity of precious
metals can be increased;

4.

high tariffs and all the possible means to control
imports as well as direct promotion of exports by
government authorities were used in order to at¬
tain trade surplus;

5.

since all countries cannot attain trade surplus
simultaneously, hostility amongst nations is in¬
evitable .

* later mercantilists
classicists.

(e.g.

Steuart) have the coloration of
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According to mercantilism,

imports are a necessary evil

and ought to be carried out only if they are:
1.

essentials which cannot be produced domestically;

2.

raw materials with high labor contents for eventual
re-exports;

3.

compensation for other country's imports from the
concerned country.

Thus the implicit mercantilist ideal is zero import.

Even in France where mercantilism was most prominent
during the fifteenth to eighteenth century, many worried
that the severity of French import restrictions would re¬
sult in other countries's retaliation.

But Colbert per¬

sisted that only France alone, with her large population
and domestic market,

can produce the whole range of commodi¬

ties , whereas no others could dispense with French commodi¬
ties .

Thus France should not worry about others' reaction

to her protectionism.
o

Thomas Mun

advocated that gold export to buy goods

which is to be re-exported later is desirable and necessary
for the national interest in the long run.

Also David

q

Hume

pointed out that a trade surplus leads to an expansion

of money supply and to an inflation which ultimately hampers
exports and thus eliminates the trade surplus.

The fever

of protectionism subsided as more rational classical school
gained momentum.

Whenever domestic economy gets in trouble,
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however, the ghost of mercantilism haunts only to further
aggravate the depression.^

Much of the neo-mercantilism (protectionism) argued
by the labor unions all around the world is based on the
protection of transitional unemployment which is necessary
for any adjustment toward optimum allocation.

But their

goal is entrenched with self-defeating elements as well as
being detrimental to the public interest in both the short
run and the long run.
For instance, if the U.S. raises the current tariff
rate of 10 per cent of shoes to 40 per cent as the Inter¬
national Trade Commission(ITC) recommended, 5,100 jobs will
be saved on the assumption that labor union's claim is cor¬
rect.

^

The ITC proposal would, however, add another $1

to the retail price of casual shoes made abroad resulting
in a $500 million extra burden to the American consumers a
year.

This means each shoe worker is subsidized with

about $100,000 not considering the loss of reciprocal for¬
eign demand which can only be financed by corresponding ex¬
ports .

Furthermore, this kind of misallocation of resour¬

ces tends to decrease the efficiency of efficient sectors
thus making them less competitive.

Therefore,

sound value

system of economics based on rational assessment of the re¬
ality should be mobilized once again for the public interest.
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4. PRICE THEORY
A. ABSOLUTE ADVANTAGE THEORY

This division of labor, according to Adam Smith‘d, can
benefit all the concerned parties on an international scale
as well as on a national scale.

To be benefited by abso¬

lute advantage, every country should concentrate on what it
can produce more economically than others and trade for the
goods which others produce at less cost.

Thus, interna¬

tional trade enhances the utilization of unused factors of
production.

John Stuart Mill ^ later called this "Vent of

Surplus" theory of international trade.

B.

COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE THEORY
David Ricardo‘S went one step further by stating that

it is not the absolute, but the comparative advantages which
cause and determine the patterns of international trade.
Even if a country were absolutely advantageous or disadvan¬
tageous in producing everything, it would still be benefited
to concentrate on the production of the goods which are com¬
paratively advantageous.

His implicit assumptions are followed:
1.

no economies of scale and no technological change;

2.

fixed factor supply and full employment;

3.

no transportation cost and free trade;

4.

the costs are determined by the amount of labor
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put into the product;
5.

perfect mobility of production factors domestically
and perfect immobility internationally.

Then he goes on to the familiar example of England and Por¬
tugal .

Table 2.

Unit Cost of Production Before Trade
(Men a year)

Products

England

Portugal

Wine (a gallon)

120

80

Cloth (a yard)

100

90

Source: The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo, Lon¬
don"! Sraff (ed.), 1952, Vol. 1, pp. 135-136.

In England a gallon of wine costs 120 men for one year
and a yard of cloth 100, while in Portugal the real cost of
wine and cloth amounts to 80 and 90 men for a year respec¬
tively.

Portugal thus has an absolute advantage over Eng¬

land in the production of either commodity, but a compara¬
tively greater advantage in the production of wine since
80/120 is smaller than 90/100.

The pre-trade price

ratio

of wine and cloth would be proportional to their costs of
production, that is,
Portugal.

120

:

100 in England and 80

: 90 in

Thus cloth is comparatively cheap in England

and wine is comparatively cheap in Portugal.

After trade is opened between the two countries, England
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will export cloth and import wine.

Ignoring transport

costs, an equilibrium price will result which will lie be¬
tween the limits of 120

: 100.

If England now specializes

in the porduction of cloth and transfers labor from agricul¬
ture into industry, it can produce 1.2 units of cloth for
each unit of wine, which it no longer produces.

These

units of cloth now can be exchanged for 1.2 units of im¬
ported wine from Portugal.

Through trade, England will

gain extra 0.2 units of wine for each unit of cloth export¬
ed.

Thus the same quantity of goods produced could now be

procured at lower real cost.
Accordingly, despite that Portugal produces both wine
and cloth more efficiently, she would benefit by concentrat¬
ing on wine production and importing cloth from England.
For England, even though she produces less efficiently than
Portugal in both wine and cloth, she can still benefit by
concentrating on cloth production and trading with Portugal.
This economic justification of free trade is probably the
most significant contribution of the classical school.

On the basis of prewar statistics on labor proaucti16

vity in the the U.S. and Britain, McDougall*
assess the theory.

attempted to

He examined the productivity in twenty-

five industries and their exports to the third countries.
His finding upheld the theory of comparative advantage with
regard to the U.S. and 3ritish trade with others.
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Bhagwati,^ however, refutes the argument on the basis
that correlation coefficients are insignificant and labor
productivity is not datum in the sense that production
functions are.

Further weakness is that data on labor

productivity are unaccompanied by any explanation of why
the labor productivity is what it is and how it may be ex¬
pected to change.

Moreover, even if we could predict

changes in labor productivity, we could not tell that the
pattern of trade would change in a specified manner.

In the two-commodity case, constant comparative costs
merely set the limits between which the ratio of interna¬
tional trade will fall.

Their exact location will be de¬

termined by the interplay of the forces of demand and supply.
This is known as the theory of international value, which
was conceived by John Stuart Mill.

Mill developed the

theory of the import demand of country in terms of its own
exports.

In this context, he employed the concept of de¬

mand elasticity which has become widely used by many contem¬
porary theorists.

He also considered the concept of mul¬

tiple equilibria,

as well as economic consequences of tar¬

iff under different elasticities of demand.
Marshall further developed the theory of international
value by introducing the concept of reciprocal demand and
supply curves.

"Reciprocal" here means that the demand

curve of country A for the products of country B is simul-
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taneously A's supply curve of its own exports.

By this he

attempts to derive a general equilibrium in international
trade.

Each point along such a curve is in effect a possi¬

ble point of equilibrium and each movement along the curve
presupposes that the economy of the concerned country has
adapted itself to the new equilibrium situation.

The classical theory of comparative cost, nevertheless,
contains a considerable amount of vulnerability.

First,

although some degree of arbitrary assumptions are generally
accepted practice of model building,
theory construction)
mantal assumptions.

(inherent nature of

there are too many unrealistic fundaFor instance,

transportation costs

seriously impinge upon comparative advantage.
the two-factor,
are relaxed,

Also, once

two-country, and two-commodity assumptions

the patterns of trade based on the comparative

advantage can no longer hold.

Second,

labor costs are not

identical throughout a country and are even more so inter¬
nationally.

Labor is not homogeneous and indeed this is

one of the causes of international trade occurring.

Third,

this does not tell us about the exchange ratio itself or
about the actual quantities traded, because it ignores the
demand side of international trade.

Finally, no allowance

is made for income change or technology and resources,

thus

the analysis is of static nature.
Despite many deficiencies,

the doctrine of comparative
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advantage has enjoyed unparalleled longevity compared with
other economic theories.

We are not sure whether this is

a favorable or unfavorable symptom for the advancement of
the science.

Probably one of the reasons why there are

few controversies is that variables are unrealistic and unquantifiable, thus untestable.

Yet it has such strong in¬

tuitive appeal that it is rather difficult to refute.

C. THE HECKSCHER-OHLIN THEORY

The classical theory of international trade was suc¬
cessful in explaining differences in the relative share of
different countries in terms of the different productivity
of labor in the relevant industries.

But the existence of

the differences in comparative costs was left unexplained.
Heckscher first attempted to explain this by the different
factor endowments of the different countries.

The theory

was significantly elaborated by Ohlin, but owes a great
deal to Samuelson for its analytical techniques and propo¬
sitions .
Heckscher-Ohlin theory adapts most of the assumptions
employed by comparative advantage theory except the follow¬
ing:
1.

it deals with production in terms of money cost
instead of real cost.

Thus it is no longer binded

by the labor theory of value;
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2.

two factors of production instead of one are used;

3.

for a given commodity, the same production func¬
tion, homogeneous in the first degree, is used in
all countries.

Thus, a given change in all inputs

results in an equal change in output;
4.

the production function is governed by the law of
constant returns to scale;

5.

the number of factors is not greater than the num¬
ber of commodities;

6.

pure competition rules throughout.

Under these assumptions, international trade will occur
as long as there are differences in the relative price ratios
of domestic goods among the countries.

Suppose countries A

and B endowed with fixed quantities of two factors of pro¬
duction,
Y.

labor(L) and capital(K) produce commodities X and

Assume that A is relatively labor abundant B is capi¬

tal abundant on the basis of the physical definition of
factor abundance.

Finally assume that commodity X is labor

intensive relative to Y for all factor-price ratios.

If the two countries produced the two commodities in
the same proportion,

the following equation held:

Q in A
0
in B
2x_ = jx_ ,
Q in A
T

Q in B
7

where Q is output.

Because of different factor endowments,

commodity X would be relatively cheaper in A than in B:
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Px in A
P

y

<

in A

P
P

x

y

in B

where P is price.

in B

Alternatively, at the same relative commodity prices, A
would be producing relatively more X than Y compared with
B.

Thus following inequality would hold:
in A

in B

Qy in A

Qy in B

Given any factor price ratio (i.e., w/r),

therefore,

the optimum coefficients of production can be determined.
This can be done by determining the points on the unit iso¬
quants of X and Y where the absolute value of the slope of
each isoquant is equal to the given ratio w/r.

The co¬

ordinates of these points are the optimum coefficients of
production.
a^x,

and a^

Assume that these coefficients are a^x, a^

,

, where the first subscript indicates the fac¬

tor and the second the commodity.

These coefficients are

common to both countries because of the assumption of iden¬
tical production function.
Since it has been assumed that X is labor intensive
relative to Y,

the following inequality must also be satis¬

fied :
fix
akx

v

fry
^y

The commodity-price ratio is given by
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_ Wr) (alx + akx)
Py

(w/r)(aly + aky>

'

Finally, for full employment it is required that the follow¬
ing two equations be satisfied:
alx X + aly y

= L’

akxX+akyy " K
where L and K indicate overall factor endowments.

Solving

the above equations for X and Y, we get

X = i (L aky - K aly),

Y=i(Kaix-

Lakx),

where A = a-,
a,
-a.-,
a,
lx ky
ly ky.

Consider the following ratio:
X

L a

Y

l£L
K a
lx -

* aly

=

(L/K)

La

kx

‘lx

aky
-

lv

(L/K) akx

This can be simplified to
X.
Y

=

R - R
C -£ >
R - R
'

0,

X

L

3-1

where C = .iff. >
akx

R =

- ,
X

R

x

=

'lx
kx

R =
y

iy
Lkv

The right-hand side of the above equation is necessarily
positive because R is a weight average of Rx and R .
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Accordingly, R must necessarily lie between
fundamental property of weighted averages.

and R

a

Hence both the

numerator and denominator of the right-hand side of the
above equation are positive.

Differentiating the ratio X/Y with respect to R, we get
d (X/Y)
_

R
—

r

dR

- R
y

£

(Rx - R)2 .

The sign of this derivative coincides with the sign of the
difference Rx - R^.

Since, by assumption, 0/R^.^R^,

the

derivative of X/Y with respect to R must be positive.
This means that the higher the value of R, the higher the
value of the ratio X/Y.
in A than in B,

Since R is assumed to be higher

at the same relative factor and commodity

prices, A is producing more X per unit of Y than B.

This

process continues until the price ratio is equalized in
both countries.

The theory has an intuitive appeal, but it calls for
some qualifications.
not homogeneous.

First,

the factors of production are

The quality of labor as well as the na¬

ture of capital structure are significantly different inter¬
firm and internationally.

Also capital goods may not be

substitutable to labor and vice versa.

The production of

manufactured goods, owing to reduced transportation costs,
is no longer so confined by factor endowment as it used to
be.

For example, Japan, with small deposits of iron ore,
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produces more steel than any other country.

Manufactured

commodities constitute more than seventy per cent of the
total international trade so that the Heckscher-Ohlin
theory does not explain all international trade.

Second, as in the case of classical theory,

the Heck¬

scher-Ohlin theory commits the serious fallacy of composi¬
tion.

This is probably due to the social scientists' gen¬

eral affinity to the natural science's neat theoretical
framework and its precise prescription.

The comparative

advantage theory is built on the assumptions which are un¬
realistic and yet so fundamental to the argument.
stance, it is built on two-factor,
country assumptions.

two-commodity, and two-

Then with little modification, it is

extended to a general model.
more than two always.

For in¬

But three is not just one

Three may be an entirely new entity

Transitivity needs not apply to social phenomena.

There¬

fore, social science may not fit to the same methodology as
that of the natural science.
Third, production techniques are not the same in all
areas.

Many goods can be produced in different factor-in-

tensive ways, but at similar costs.

Fixed overhead cost

along with expansion of market will inevitably lead to
lower marginal cost; economies of scale.

There may be dis

economies of scale on a factory level technologically, but
not on a company level which is the unit of the decision-
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making in international trade.

The company would invest

in a second factory if the first ran into increasing costs.
Relinquishing this assumption will thus, make the HeckscherOhlin theory as useful as salt without savor.

Finally, although all the theoretical models are based
on unrealistic assumptions by definition,
in its arbitrariness.
limit,

there is a limit

Once any assumptions cross this

the theoretical model can never be mended to have

even a slightest relevance to real world.

In this regard,

Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, no matter how logically consistent
it may be,

cannot have external relevance.

For instance,

the inclusion of public policy factor may change all other
variables not in a matter of degree but of quality.

All

the economic models are based on the assumption that Man
behaves rationally in economic sense (i.e. profit maximi¬
zation) .

But economically rational behavior may not ne¬

cessarily be politically rational behavior and vice versa.
Specifically,

an economically irrational public policy often

turns out to be politically or militarily

rational one.

Thus combining these two contradicting factor without pro¬
per thought would grossly distort the reality.
this

3tudy

Accordingly,

focuses on the fundamental problems raised by

unrealistic assumptions rather than elaborating the pre¬
vious model.
The Stolper-Samuelson^ theory has stood up a little
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better,

although it too depends on a whole set of unrealis¬

tic assumptions.

It has always been realized that tariff

affect the distribution of income.

While the country as

a whole loses from a tariff, particular sectors may gain.
Stolper and Samuelson showed that it is possible for a sec¬
tor to gain absolutely as well as relatively from a tariff,
independent of the consumption pattern and therefore not
involving an index-number problem.

The core of argument is that a tariff will raise the
real income of a country's scarce factor because:
1.

protection increases the relative price of import¬
able goods;

2.

an increase in the relative price of good increases
the real income of the factor used intensively in
its production;

3.

the importable good is intensive in the use of the
factor which is scarce domestically.

Metzler

19

pointed out that protection may not increase

the price of the importable good, since it may improve the
terms of trade sufficiently to shift the terms of trade in
favor of exports.

The necessary condition is that elas-

tidity of demand for exports is less than the domestic mar¬
ginal propensity to consume for exportable goods.

Thus,

a necessary condition for the perverse Metzler result is
that the export demand elasticity is less than unity.
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Several economists have made efforts to explore the im¬
plications for the factor-price equalization theorem of the
existence of more than two countries, goods, and factors.
They have rightly felt that an answer to this question was
an indispensable first step in deciding whether the theorem
might have any empirical significance.

The effect of multiple countries on the analysis,
other variables held constant, has been found to pose no
problem.

Both Tinbergen and Meade have argued that adding

more countries merely adds an equal number of equations and
unknowns to the equation system.

The determinateness of

the system, and the conclusion that prices of comparable
factors will be equalized by trade, are not affected.
bergen,
out,

Tin¬

a Nobel laureate along with Ohlin and Meade, points

though, that the assumption that no country will spe¬

cialize completely is more and more likely to be violated
as we go on adding countries with divergent factor endow¬
ments,

and "the equalisation of factor prices will only

exist as long as not one of the countries is forced - by
its data in connection with those of the production functions and the price ratio - to specialise.”

21

But perhaps Tinbergen's statement needs some qualifi¬
cation.

Consider a multi-country model in which there

exists, at the equilibrium position for the system,

a sub¬

set of countries each of which continues to produce a^._
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commodities included in the system.

Given all the other

assumptions attaching to the theorem, factor prices will be
equalized among this subset of countries.
ever,

In general, how¬

factor prices will not be equalized among specialized

countries, or between specialized and nonspecialized.

The more difficult problems involved in extending the
theorem to cases of different numbers of goods and factors
have been dealt with by means of complete systems by Tinbergen and Meade.

22

The most basic conclusion to arise from

these efforts is that the factor-price equalization theorem
holds for all cases in which the numbers of factors and
goods are identical.

When they become unequal, however,

it makes considerable difference for the result whether the
quantity of factors of the quantity of goods is greater.
Suppose that in a two-country model, with n goods and m
factors of production, we take international prices as fixed
and given by international demand conditions.

Then the

relevant equations reduce to the following for each country:

1 = x.

w. = p .
j
ri

ail
(
x.

x. (a. ,
i
ll

a.

in

x.

),

(i = 1,... ,n)

i

• • aim)7 aij

(i
1, . . . , n,
j = 1,... ,m)

These two sets of equations give, respectively,

the

output of each commodity as a function of the quantities of
all inputs and the wage of each factor as its

(identical)
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marginal value productivity in each industry.

prices, and p^'s product prices.

The a..'s

There are nm + m equa¬

tions to determine nm 4- m variables, the w. , and the a. . .
3
30
Obviously, they will just suffice for this purpose if n
equals m.
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If m is greater than n,

tirely fail to hold.

the theorem will en¬

No longer can all of the a^.

and

w. be determined from given international prices and production functions; the condition must be added that the
quantities of factors available are fully employed.

This method of rendering such a model determinate is
quite logical; given all international prices,

it is in¬

tuitively clear that we can deduce the allocation of pro¬
duction and factor employment once we have information on
the nation's total factor supplies.

Specifically, we add

to the two sets of equations above another set in the form

requiring that factor markets be cleared.

There are m

equations in this form containing n new unknowns,
The (m - n) underdeterminacy is just offset.
quantities of factors in different countries

the

's.

But different
(so long as

the differences are not governed wholly by a single propor¬
tionality factor) will influence the dependent variables
listed above, rendering factor-price equalization no longer
likely.
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Where the n;usher of goods exceeds the number of fac¬
tors (n} m), the natter gets sore complicated.

Tinbergen

examining the equation system describing such a situation,
found it to be partly underdetemir.ee and partly overceter
mined, therefore, in general, indeterminate.

Kis conclu¬

sion was that specialization would as a rale be necessary,
and "this no longer warrants the equality of factor
prices.

Meade disagreed with this conclusion, and Tin

bergen himself participated in the amending process.
Meade shewed that a subset of equations in the model
Tinbergen used is not overdetermined, but rather appears
exactly determined

That is, it seems as if ail prices

and factor proportions are determined by supply conditions
alone.

When the system is reformulated, it does indeed

appear that there is one degree of freedom within the sub¬
set.

The economic meaning of this, Meade contended, is

that demand conditions are necessary to specify one rela¬
tive price relationship in the model,

'"but for the rest

they determine only the amounts of the various products
which will be consumed."

Assuming throughout that none

of the three products is produced in only one country,
Meade holds that the essence of the indeterminacy of the
svstem is the absolute size of the three industries within
eacn or the two countries

26
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D.

CONTEMPORARY PRICE THEORIES

Actually most of the contemporary price theories are
partially adjusted versions of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory.
Leontief,

27

on the basis of his input-output table, exa¬

mines how much capital and labor are required in order to
produce one million dollars in the export industries and in
the import competition industries in the U.S.
scher-Ohlin theory is correct,

If the Heck-

the U.S. which is presumably

more capital abundant than the rest of the world, would
export capital-intensive goods and import labor-intensive
goods.

Leontief's results are summarized in the follow¬

ing table:
Table 3.

Factor Requirements of the U.S. Exports and
Imports Replacements
(per million dollars of output of average 1947 composition)

Factors

1947
export

Capital
2,551
1947 $(1,000)
Labor
men year

181

1951
import

export

import

3,091

2,257

2,303

170

174

168

Source: Leontief, Wassily.
"Domestic Production and Foreign
Trade: the American Capital Position Re-examined."
Economia Intemazionale, February, 1954.
Caves 6c
Johnson, Readings in International Economics, Homewood, Irwin, 1968, pp. 510-519.
The above table indicates that capital ratio of imports
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to exports for 1947 is 1.30 and that for 1951 is 1.11.
This means that imports are more capital-intensive than the
goods exported by the U.S.

This contradicts the Heckscher-

Ohlin theory and caused a great deal of concern among eco¬
nomists, widely known as the Leontief's paradox.

Leontief

himself conjectured that this may be due to the fact that
American workers are three times more efficient that of the
counterparts in the rest of the world.

28

Thus, if the la¬

bor were measured in terms of efficiency units, then the
U.S. will be more labor abundant than the rest of the world.
Although Leontief's contention reveals a very inter¬
esting point, it is still an open question as to how we can
prove that the American workers are three times more effi¬
cient than the workers in the rest of the world.
ample,

For ex¬

comparing the sales per employee for the 500 largest

industrials in the U.S.

and that of Japan, Japanese workers

were more productive than the u.S. counterparts.

Assets

per employee are also higher in Japan than the U.S.

Find¬

ings are summarized in the following table 4.

Although the number of the corporations is very limit¬
ed,

their combined sales represent about the half of the

gross national products of each country.

Also double

counting problems impose some qualifications, but we can
still safely project that Leontief's conjecture is some¬
what insecurely founded.

A more important aspect of the
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Table 4.

The 500 Largest Industrials in the U.S. and
Japan (1975)
U.S.

Japan

865.2

204.7

37.8

2.1

668.5

215.5

14.4

2.7

Sales Per Employee

60,035.0

76,893.0

Assets Per Employee

46,383.0

80,937.0

2,626.0

774.0

Total Sales

($ billion)

Total Profits
(after-tax)
Total Assets

($ billion)

($ billion)

Total Employees

(million)

Profits Per Employee

Source: Compiled from The President Directory, Diamond-Time
Co. Tokyo, 1977, pp. 24-48; Fortune, May 1976,
pp. 316-341.

study, however, is that it rufutes one of the key assump¬
tions underlying the Heckscher-Ohlin theory: homogeneous
labor.
Following the Leontief’s paradox, many economists have
attempted to rectify the theory from various perspectives.
One of them is Linder

who states that the basis of exports

is the satisfaction of domestic needs; goods are produced
for the domestic market first and only after that for the
foreign market.

Since domestic demand is determined by

income, exports normally go to countries with a comparable
standard of living.

This is contrary to the countries with

different factor endowments.
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Kravis
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suggests that in the U.S. government tends to

shut out imports that could be produced domestically al¬
though at much higher cost.

His contention is that the de¬

terminants of the pattern of trade is availability or supply
elasticities.

"In short,

it is the elasticity of supply

abroad and its elasticity at home that give rise to this
import trade, not the relative capital or labor requirements of the products."

31

Availability depends partially upon factor endowments,
although technological progress and product differentiation
shape the pattern of trade.

By treating natural resources

factor of production as the principal determinant of trade
Linder has narrowed down the Heckscher-Ohlin theory, in
spite of the fact that this is more realistic than Leontief's conception.
Many theorists contend that technological changes ex¬
plain the pattern of trade.
ed,

Once an invention is perfect¬

the concerned country has a monopoly power over the

market.

As mass-production process is processed,

ers become increasingly price-conscious.

the buy¬

In this phase

the production technique may be extended to other countries.
Imitation by other countries terminates the technological
lead and, through lower production costs and product differ¬
entiation, they even export to the country where the inven¬
tion is originated.

We have witnessed this kind of pro-
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duct cycle happening in the electronic, computer, and copy¬
ing machine industries as well as in automobile industry.

Along this line of thought, Hoffmeyer

32

states that

the U.S. exports of research-intensive goods increased much
faster than its exports of other goods.
ratios are 20
59 and 5
Hafbarer

:
33

The respective

: 3 for the period between 1910-14 and 1953-

1.7 for the period between 1926-30 and 1953-59.
thinks that the technological lag, along with

the economies of scale,

caused the pattern of international

trade in synthetic chemical industry.

Keesing^ also be¬

lieves that there is a strong correlation between research
and development intensity in the U.S. industries and their
export performance.

5.

INCOME THEORY
A theory no matter how ill-conceived it is,

tends not

to be destroyed by intermittent criticisms, but is usually
replaced by a better theory.
is no exception.

The Heckscher-Ohlin theory

This theory may explain nineteenth cen¬

tury international trade in which primary commodities play¬
ed a predominant role.

But things have changed as a re¬

sult of the reduced transportation costs and constantly
changing structure of trade resulting from industrializa¬
tion.

Accordingly,

factor endowments have become less

significant than they were in the last century.
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Many other forces affect price differences - demand
conditions, economies of scale,
production functions.

technology, and differing

Indeed we are living in a world of

substantially arbitrary and inflexible price structures, of
planned economies at the various levels, and of omnipotent
labor unions.

The Heckscher-Ohlin theory is by no means

relevant for such a world.

Furthermore, even if relevancy if improved, HeckscherOhlin theory would still suffer from its neglect of the de¬
mand and income aspects of international trade.

Production

is a necessary but not sufficient condition for internation¬
al trade to occur, because effective demand, not factor en¬
dowment, is the generator of actual international trade.
Failure to see this is precisely what plagued neoclassical
economists in explaining the chronic depression in 1920's.
Although Galbraith among a few others, emphasizes the large
corporation's ability to generate the demand for its own
products through product differentiation,

demand creation

still remains a limited phenomenon of oligapolistic markets.
said,

35

The essence of business,

as Henry Kaiser once

is basically finding the demand and filling it.

Failing to do so would only result in bankruptcy.
long run,

therefore,

In the

demand dictates supply rather than the

other way around, because production cannot be sustained
indefinitely at the absence of an actual effective demand.
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The income effect is dynamic in contrast to the static
nature of the price theory.

Income generated by exports

is further expanded through the multiplier-accelerator ef¬
fects.

New demand in both consumption and investment sec¬

tors created by larger income, which is in return generated
by exports, activates the potential imports of an economy.
When there are more than two hundred economies instead of
two, these multiplier-accelerator effects can be amplified
in much larger magnitude,

as long as the concerned countries

are not over-anxious to attain the instant balance of bila¬
teral trade.

Moreover, even if there is no comparative advantage
between two countries, international trade will still gen¬
erate higher income and more employment via this multiplieraccelerator effects than if there were no trade.
ample,

For ex¬

there is no comparative advantage whatsoever between

country A and B, yet an ambitious entrepreneur of industry
X in country Y perceived potential opportunity in sales ex¬
pansion through exports.

As a consequence of export, in¬

come of the country A will be expanded and also factors of
production will be reallocated in favor of industry X.
This successful sector in the economy bids up the factor
prices so that the other passive industry will be declining.
This gives country B, which is strained for foreign exchange,
a better chance to export Y to country A.

Therefore, com-
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parative advantage emerges as a result of international
trade, rather than as a cause of it.

The implication of this argument is that there is no
such a thing as rigid, inherent comparative advantage or
disadvantage in the pattern of international trade.

Thus

economic development policy through export expansion should
not be shackled by any presupposed,
theory.

fixed comparative cost

Comparative advantage is a rather flexible and

resulting effect of international trade.

Consequently,

a country should pay more attention to the income effect
of international trade than to price effects which are too
partial to determine the patterns of trade.

The multiplier-accelerator effects, however, can be
activated only when exports are linked to investment by
importing producer goods which will further enhance the
productivity of an economy.

Unless these are activated,

the trade effect on income growth remains minimal.

That

is why mere linkage of exports to economic development fail¬
ed to explain the slow growth of the economies which have
high export growth rates such as in Rwanda, Upper Volta,
etc.
On the other hand,
without exception,

all of the developed countries,

attained the present income level through

a rapid export expansion either during the nineteenth or
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early twentieth century.

As Robertson

indicated,

was an ’’engine of growth”

in the last century.

trade

This means

that trade is not only a means of optimum resource alloca¬
tion, but also a vehicle of expanding income.
caused this disparity?

Then what

The constant ploughing-back of the

income generated by exports and resulting multiplier-acce¬
lerator effects made the difference.

Thus it is not sur¬

prising to find that no single developed economy was devel¬
oped by direct foreign investment and foreign aid which do
not accompany this constant ploughing-back of income.
Also this explains why the countries, whose high export
growth was attained by foreign direct investment,

could not

sustain high economic growth rate.
The theories of income effect of international trade
can be further divided into growth theory, balance of pay¬
ment theory, and terms of trade theory.

The monetary side

of international trade is represented by balance of trade
and the terms of trade theory.

The real side of inter¬

national trace is viewed by growth theory or multiplieraccelerator theory.

A. GROWTH THEORY (MULTIPLIER-ACCELERATOR THEORY)

The foreign trade multiplier theory grew out ot the
Kevnesian svstem but was not developed bv Keynes himself.
The dynamic version of the foreign trade multiplier is pri-
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marily the work of Machlup
hand, Harrod

39

and Meade

40
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and Metzler.
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On the other

developed the static version.

Static theory describes and compares equilibrium conditions
at different times.

Dynamic theory examines the transi¬

tion from one equilibrium to another.

The assumptions of the Machlup's theory are following:
1.

marginal costs are constant, thus prices remain
unchanged;

2.

financing of grade deficit is unlimited;

3.

the marginal propensity to import and the mar¬
ginal propenisty to consume are constant;

4.

imports during the period t(Mt) depend upon the
income of the preceeding period (Y

In an open economy,
dered as leakage.
in a closed economy,

1

1

s + m

1 - c

:

import as well as saving is consi¬

Thus,just like investment multiplier
trade multiplier becomes

where s = 1 - c being the marginal propensity to save and
m the marginal propensity to import.

Suppose country A's

marginal propensity to save is 0.2 in a closed economy then
multiplier would 5.
is

If the marginal propensity to import

.13 in an open economy,

then multiplier will be reduced
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to 3 since a greater portion of investment expenditures
will leak out of national income system than before.

If, however, these phenomena are cumulated throughout
the world, the money leaked abroad will flow back into the
country in much greater mahnitude.

As rule, the actual

magnitude depends upon foreign propensity to consume and
marginal propensity to import.

The reason is that the

rest of the world's economy will be stimulated by the in¬
crease of A’s demand and will therefore, in return import
more from country A.

Hence the true multiplier will be

greater than the foreign trade multiplier which ignores
these indirect effects.

This reciprocal demand is pre¬

cisely the underlying idea of the Marshall Plan, although
real intention is more complicated by political considera¬
tion.

The result was, as we all know, a most striking

success.

This implies some future course of global scale

mutual prosperity through open economic policy despite
many hinderances.

B. BALANCE OF TRADE THEORY

In general there are three ways to restore the balance
of trade;
1.

gold transfer;

2.

fluctuating exchange rate;

3.

direct exchange control and regulation of interna¬
tional trade.
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Under the gold standard system, only domestic price and
wage levels change.

Under flexible exchange rate system,

domestic price and wage levels remain unchanged while ex¬
change rate adjusts itself.

The relative prices of diffee-

ent commodities, however, will have to change in the pro¬
cess of adjustment, even if the general price level remains
unchanged.

Most of the balance of trade theories, never¬

theless, focus on the adjustment mechanism under the flexi¬
ble exchange rate system.

Haberler^ develops an excellent partial-equilibrium
anlysis.

The key concept is the marginal propensity to

import, AM/AY, which is analogous to the Keynes’ marginal
propensity to consume.
for imports

The income elasticity of demand

(E) will be denoted in the following way:

ah / ay

Am

y

m/y

Ay

m

e = -= — » _
where M/Y is the average propensity to import.

Suppose that the marginal propensity to import of the
country A (MPI^) is 1/3 and that of B (MPI^)

is 2/3.

If

deficit arised in A, A will import less by 1/3 of the
amount of deficit and B more by 2/3 of the amount of trade
surplus.

Thus income effects are just enough to restore

equilibrium.

If MPI^ + MPI^< 1, however, the income ef¬

fects are too weak to reestablish equilibrium in the ba¬
lance

of payments.

On the other hand,

if MPI^ + MPI^ > 1
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then income effects are so strong that the deficit will be
overcompensated eventually.

Therefore,

if the sum of the country's demand for im¬

ports and the corresponding foreign demand for its exports
is greater than unity,

then a currency devaluation can im¬

prove the balance of payments.
than unity, then devaluation

If this sum is smaller
will only worsen the balance

of payments.

The contraries are not rare.

The reason is that

there is often great danger that the favorable effects of
a devaluation of the balance of payments will be jeopar¬
dized by incautious wage and monetary policies.

Pressure

in this direction is so strong because, under full employ¬
ment,

improvement in the balance of payments is necessarily

accompanied by a painful reduction in consumption and in¬
vestment.

Under this circumstamce, government tends to

alleviate recession and the transitional unemployment, by
means of generous fiscal and monetary policies.

6.

CONCLUSION AND HYPOTHESES
The development of international trade theories can

be summed up under the three distinctive lines of thought:
protectionism, price theory, and income theory.

Modern

protectionism can be subclassified into unemployment ar¬
gument of the trade unions of declining industries in the
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developed countries and infant industries argument of less
developed countries.

The first thought on the price theory can be traced
back to Adam Smith’s absolute advantage.

Comparative ad¬

vantage expanded its horizon by stating that even if a coun¬
try has an absolutely advantageous or disadvantageous in
producing both goods, international trade can still be be¬
neficial to all the trading partners.

This became a power¬

ful driving force for free trade.

The Heckscher-Ohlin theory further elaborated the in¬
ternational price theory by explaining the existence of the
different comparative costs in terms of different factor
endowments.

This, however, has serious drawbacks.

It is

unrealistic and neglects the aspects of income and demand
of international trade.

This calls for more general

theory based on realistic assumptions.
The income theory fills this need neatly.
come effect is dynamic in nature,
nature of price theory.

First,

in¬

contrast to the static

Second, this does not require com¬

parative advantage to be a prelude to international trade.
Third,

income theory explains the real international trade

phenomena far better than price theory does.

Last, income

theory is less bound by unrealistic assumptions than price
theory.

Therefore,

this income theory is qualified to be
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further developed into a fuller general theory of interna¬
tional trade.
bility,

But it still lacks the quality of applica¬

since it left out consumer taste, conditions of

production, and especially public policy as variables.

Public policy requires special attention because it
changes not only the conditions of production, but also
of consumption and distribution.

Indeed, public policy is

the social embodiment of economic subject, Man himself.
Therefore,

leaving this out makes the whole theoratical

framework an empty exercise.

This leads to the hypothese of this study:
1.

Comparative advantage is not a factor which is
vested and fixed;

2.

The state of comparative advantage is constantly
changed by the interaction of the public policy
and the entrepreneurs'

adaptability to their chang¬

ing economic reality;
3.

Comparative advantage is not a sufficient driving
force of international trade, but a necessary fac¬
tor resulting from exogenous efforts;

4.

The active driving force of international trade
and the determinant of international trade patterns
are the wills of entrepreneurs and government to
improve the income and employment levels through
market expansion.
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This broadens the scope of assumptions because public poli¬
cy necessarily implies value judgements of society.

7. METHODOLOGY AND BACKGROUND

This study is basically exploratory.

Accordingly,

historical method was used to substantiate the hypotheses
of the study.

By examining the growth of the U.S. aero¬

space industry and its export pattern during the last seven¬
ty years, this study attempted to suggest a new way to ex¬
plain the export behavior of an industry.

Especially, for

the purpose of appreciating the causation in international
trade,

an intuitive observation of economic phenomena is

inevitably necessitated.

Past research has suggested that exports play a sig¬
nificant role in expanding national income via multiplieraccelerator effects.

However,

they offer no explanation

as to what causes the present patterns of foreign trade,
and by what mechanism.

If we are to address ourselves

to these questions, we must utilize empirical data.
U.S.

The

aerospace industry is an ideal case to use in address¬

ing this inquiry.
As of 1975, its total sales amounted to $28 billion
and its total employment was 942,000.

Of its total sales,

public expenditures amounted to $14 billion representing
about one half of the total sales of the industry.

Such
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spending may cause inflationary pressures.

However, it

is the price we pay for national security and therefore is
a political problem.

Defense spending, nevertheless,

does have some posi¬

tive impacts on the expansion of national income via ex¬
ports.

As of 1975, exports totaled $7.8 billion.

Commer¬

cial products accounted for most of the exports, totaling
$5.3 billion and compounded of $2.4 billion in commercial
transport deliveries and $2.9 billion in other civil pro¬
ducts.
lion.

The exports of military products totaled $2.5 bil¬
All together aerospace exports amounted to 7.4 per

cent of all U.S. exports.

However, because aerospace im¬

ports are minor, net trade balance of the industry is well
over $7 billion.

This constitutes 73.4 per cent of the
/ Q

U.S.

trade surplus for the year.

Therefore, the aero¬

space industry industry was the single most important sec¬
tor of the economy in lieu of the balance of payments.

But the U.S.

aerospace industry was not in that unique

position from the very beginning of its turbulent history.
Despite the fact that the first successful flight was done
by Americans,

the U.S.

aircraft industry itself was well

behind the British until the 1950's.
First,

The reasons are:

the technological level of related industries as

well as aeronautics itself lagged behind that of the Bri¬
tain.

Second, military demand which was even more crucial
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than it is now was particularly soft because the U.S. was
then under self-imposed neutrality.

Third, all the social

infra structures necessary for the industry development
such as airports, regulation,

and pilots were inadequate.

Last, demand was cyclical and erratic so that it was diffi¬
cult for the industry to maintain a steady team of resear¬
chers and developers as well as maintaining production
level.
The outbreak of World War II and subsequent changes of
public policy transform the whole industry drastically.
Technological gap was narrowed and eventually surpassed
owing to the unlimited public expenditures on research and
development.

Military demand was sky rocketed with not

only domestic procurement but also foreign demand from all
the Allies.

Virtually every county comes to have large

or small airport.

An unlimited number of pilots, trained

by military, came into civilian market and the most rigid
safety regulation was put into force thus raising the pub¬
lic confidence in aviation.

This shift of public policy

was further enhenced by the intensification of the cold
war and the space race between the U.S. and Soviet Russia.
As a result of this comparative advantage between the
U.S.

and British aerospace industries was totally reversed.

So were the patterns of foreign trade regarding aerospace
products which we would look into more thoroughly in the
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next chapter.

In short,

comparative advantage is not some

thing which suddenly appears out of nowhere, but is the cu¬
mulative result of tenacious and deliberate public policies
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CHAPTER III.
1.

GROWTH OF THE U.S. AEROSPACE INDUSTRY

DAWN OF AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY

It all began at Kitty Hawk on the 17th of December,
1903.

The 12 second flight over the distance of 100 feet

opened a new era of history.

The beginning of the aircraft

industry, however, was not glorious.

The Wright brothers

established the first aircraft company in 1909 but it was
soon closed.

The U.S. aircraft industry lagged behind its

European counterpart.

In 1914, when the Bureau of Census

recognized the existence of the industry, there were only
sixteen companies which produced 49 aircrafts during the
year.

1

Initially during World War I airplanes were used as
scouts observing enemy forces.

But it was soon recognized

that the airplane was also useful as a combat weapon.

In

1915, the Allies placed their first orders to the U.S. to
ease their own domestic porduction.

However, the U.S. air¬

craft industry was not ready for the task.

A prime bottle¬

neck was the tangled patent controversy in the U.S.
industry.

aircraft

Consequently, it was difficult to get orders

filled because some companies would not invest for fear that
suits brought against them would force them out of business.

To solve this Droblem the National Advisory Committee

2
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for Aeronautics(NACA) proposed to the industry that they
draw up a patent licensing agreement whereby everybody mak¬
ing planes for the government might share the patents.

The

cross-license agreement similar to that under which the auto¬
mobile industry had been working for years was to be adminis¬
tered by a new organization of the aircraft industry.

That

organization was the Manufacturers Aircraft Association(MAA).
Any aircraft manufacturer could become a member and have the
use of all patents under the agreement.

The Association was

to collect a blanket royalty fee of $200 for each plane and
apportion it among the patent owners as stipulated.

Yet many problems remained to be solved.

3

There was no

time to design and test a new aircraft, however, no opera¬
tional fighter had been fully developed in the U.S.

Only

the European aircraft industry had accomplished anything in
that direction.
the U.S.

The British De Havillands was adapted by

as a production model.

But the Allied Missions

insisted that the U.S. produce only parts and engines while
the planes were to be assembled in Europe.

In spite of all 0i-

these difficulties, an ambitious program of producing 20,000
combat planes and 9,000 trainers was inaugurated.

The num4
ber of employees increased rapidly from 5,000 to 175,000.
Other industries including,

the automobile industry, were

called upon in the production which had rapidly expanded.
Congress appropriated $1.6 billion for the Army Air
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Corps during the twenty-one months of the U.S. participation
in the war.

But nearly half of that amount remained in the

U.S. Treasury.

After the war another large sum was recover¬

ed through liquidation and sales of supplies.

A consider¬

able amount was spent abroad since the U.S. aircraft industry
was not ready to supply aircraft of the required specifica¬
tions.

The Army

purchased 5,229 airplanes and 7,059 air¬

craft engines from European aircraft industry.

With spare

parts and the other supplies total foreign expenditures amoun¬
ted to more than $139 million.

About $350 million was spent

on airplanes, engines, and spare parts in the U.S.
mately two-thirds of this was for engines.

Approxi¬

For this, the

Army received a total of 13,894 airplanes and 41,953 aircraft
engines, including spare parts for both planes and motors.^
U.S. aircraft production up to the Armistice is shown in the
following table 5.

Data are not available prior to 1911.

It was not until the Armistice was signed that the U.S.
aircraft industry geared up to full production.

However,

the Armistice threw the industry into a chaos of reorganiza¬
tion.

The military already had more airplanes than it could

use.
The U.S.
over-manned,
of business.

aircraft industry was left overcapitalized,
and over-stocked.

Many firms quickly went out

Three months after the Armistice the aircrart

industry was liquidated to ten per cent of its wartime strength.
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Table 5.

U.S. Aircraft Production
1912 to 1918
(Number of Aircraft)

Year

Total

Military

Civil

1912

45

16

29

1913

43

14

29

1914

49

15

34

1915

178

26

152

1916

411

142

269

1917

2,148

2,013

135

1918

14,020

13,991

29

Source: Aerospace Industries Association of America, Aero¬
space Facts and Figures, 1963, Washington, P.C.,
pp. 6-7.

The remaining firms relied on the small military procurement
at irregular intervals.

The industry created the Aeronautical Chamber of Commer¬
ce in 1922 to promote commercial aviation.
industry was caught in a vicious circle.

Until then the
It could not sell

machines,

therefore,

it could not finance research and devel¬

opment.

And until it could produce better aircraft,

there

was little chance of procuring the financial support neces¬
sary for commercial aviation.
government for help.

The Chamber appealed to the

President Coolidge appointed an Air¬

craft Board under the chairmanship of Dwight Morrow.^

This

Board held hearings and rendered an exhaustive report.

As

a result of this the National Air Law was passed in 1926,
placing the responsibility for control of commercial aviation
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in the Department of Commerce.

A Five-year procurement pro¬

grams were also adopted for the military, providing for an
increasing number of aircraft each year until 1932.
Then came the Lindbergh's epic flight from New York to
Paris in May 1927.

Public enthusiasm exploded and aviation

became popular overnight.

This along with other flights

such as a transcontinental non-stop flight,

around-the-world

flight, and a North Pole flights ensured a formidable posi¬
tion for the industry in public opinion.

The U.S. aircraft

industry had finally gained the recognition necessary to
carry on the progressive development of aviation.

From 1927

to 1929 industry sales were increased from 21 million dollars
to 71 million dollars.'7

But subsequently industry sales

dropped to 26 million dollars in 1932.
duction
Table 6)

dropped

Civil aircraft pro¬

from 5,516 in 1929 to 803 in 1932.

(See

This transition was reflected in the stock price

of the Wright Company which produced the engine for Lind¬
bergh’s Spirit of St. Louis.

"A month before the flight it

was selling at 25, and by December,

1927, it had more than

tripled in value, going to 94 3/4; in another year it reach¬
es
ed 245.”
Subsequently, however, it dropped to 10 3/4 in
1930.9
The prime customer of the industry has always been the
U.S. government.
1934,

During the five-year program from 1927 to

it appropriated 436 million dollars.

The military
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Table 6.

U.S. Aircraft Production
1919 to 1938
(Number of Aircraft)

Year

Total

Military

Civil

1919
1920
1921
1922
1923

780
328
437
263
743

682
256
389
226
687

98
72
48
37
56

1924
1925
1926
1927
1928

377
789
1,186
1,995
4,346

317
447
532
621
1,219

60
342
654
1,374
3,127

1929
1930
1931 •
1932
1933

6,193
3,437
2,800
1,396
1,324

677
747
812
593
466

5,516
2,690
1,988
803
858

1934
1935
1936
1937
1938

1,615
1,710
3,010
3,773
3,623

437
459
1,141
949
1,800

1,178
1,251
1,869
2,824
1,823

Source: Aerospace Industries Association of America, Aero¬
space Facts and Figures, Washington, D.C., 1963, p.

6.

demand was confined to ten companies which received roughly
90 per cent of this business.

In other words,

286 companies manufacturing planes had
tion in this stable business.^

the other

almost no participa¬

Even among the ten largest

manufacturers, United Aircraft and Transport and CurtissWright dominated this government market.

One of the reasons

for this concentration was the complicated method of negotiat¬
ing government contracts so that practically all were let
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on a non-competitive basis.

Their relative market share is

shown in the table 7.

Table 7.

U.S. Aircraft and Engine Sales; 1927 to 1933
Millions of Dollars.(Percentage in Parenthesis)
Navy

Army

Commercial

Total

U A & T
Curtiss-Wright
Subtotal

33.2(28)
15.7(23)
48.9(71)

17.0(29)
29.0(50)
46.0(80)

28.1(48)
26.8(46)
54.9(94)

78.0(42)
75.6(39)
149.0(81)

Total of
Independents

19.7(29)

11.9(20)

3.6(6)

Total

68.6(100)

57.9(100)

Companies

35.1(19)

58.5(100)

184.9(100)

Source: Compiled from Delaney Hearings, 73rd Congress, Wash¬
ington, D.C., 1934, pp. 502-503.

Congress began to question the military procurement
procedure in 1934.

Congressman McFarlane stated that "Of

the 4,245 engines purchased by the Army since the Aircraft
Act of 1926, 2,492 were purchased from Pratt & Whitney, and
1,153 from Wright,

587 from Wright Subsidiaries, and only 13

from all other engine manufacturers together.

Since the

Aircraft Act of 1926 the Navy obtained 2,149 engines from
Pratt & Whitney,

971 from Wright,

and 36 from all others.

2 from Wright subsidiaries

He also asserted that the manu¬

facturers monopolizing military procurements were subsidiar¬
ies of the same large groups that monopolized air-mail con¬
tracts;

and that the large profits made by these subsidiaries

were not directly subject to taxation, since the parent com-
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panies filed consolidated income-tax returns.

He estimated

that the government’s loss due to this was over 2 million
dollars from 1928 to 1932.^

In 1933,

the Crane Committee reported that interlock¬

ing interests and directorates had prevented the development
of aviation,

and had resulted in the waste of public funds.

This Report recommended that operating and manufacturing
companies be separated.

13

After the great upheaval the in¬

dustry was separated into two parts: transport and manufac¬
turing.

Then the Watres Act of 1934 was passed.

The Act

prohibited interlocking directorates, overlapping interests,
certain consolidations or mergers, and mutual stockholdings
in order to break the monopoly of the large groups.

These

provisions were reaffirmed in the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938.14
But as the international political atmosphere grew tense
the aircraft industry was again in the limelight.

It had

become the most crucial means of national securit}/ to be cul¬
tivated and nurtured.

This drastic shift in its role is

also a reflection of the change in the conception of modern
warfare in the military sector.

The change in sentiment

from neutrality to defense-at-all-costs was a major factor
in the expanding defense budget.

Industry sales shot up

from $44 million in 1934 to more than $600 million in 1939.
Meanwhile,

Congress was shocked at the participation Oj.
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the aircraft industry in the international arms trade.

Pub¬

lic policy of the U.S. was not to associate with the "foreign
entanglements."

Thus, in 1934, the Congress passed a Joint

Resolution to prohibit the foreign sale of arms or munitions
of war.

Despite these policies, U.S. aircraft exports

steadily flourished as the international situation deter¬
iorated.

Aircraft exports surged upward with the exception

of a brief downturn in 1935 which was due to the Nye Commit¬
tee hearings and the Neutrality Law.

By 1938 they accounted

for 46 per cent of the industry sales compared with 5.7 per
cent ten years ago.

16

(See Table 8)

Even when the U.S.

total exports declined in 1938, aircraft exports increased
73 per cent over the last year.

Much of this rise was due

to the fact that the U.S. was the only major supplier left
out of the war.

Consequently,

the withdrawl of large pro¬

ducing countries from the world market left it open to the
U.S. manufacturers.

By 1937,

the U.S. accounted for over

45 per cent of the world's total aircraft exports.

Exports

sales of the rest of the world was $66 million compared to
$68 million for the U.S. in 1938.^

This gap was further

widened as the European War started in the late 1939.
A new Joint Resolution on neutrality was enacted by
Congress in 1939.
for

a

This new resolution included provision

"cash-and-carry" system.

The lifting of the em-

bargo and the new Act benefited aircraft industry the most.

18
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Table 8.

Total Production and Extorts of Aviation Industry
1925-1936
(3illions of Dollars)

Total

Year
✓

% of Exports to
Production

Expo

1925
1926
1927
1928
1929

12.8
17.7
30.9
64.7
91.1

6.1
5.8
6.2
5.7
10.0

0.8
1.1
1.9
3.7
9.1

1930
1931
1932
1933
1934

60.3
43.5
34.9
33.4
43.9

14. 5
10.0
22.8
27.5
40.2

S.S
4.9
7.9
9.2
17.7

1935
1936
1937
1938
1939

42.5
73.1
115.1
150.0
225.0

33.7
29.6
34.2
45.5
52.0

14.3
23.1
39.4
68.2
117.1

Source: Aircraft Production: U. S. Bureau of Air Ccmerce,
Progress of Civil Aeronautics ir. the United States :
■
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2. WORLD WAR II AND REORGANIZATION

*

This study dees not consider the role of the trade unions,
especially of such leaders as Sidney Hi1Iran, Co-Chairman
of the War Production Board(W?3), or Walter Reuther of the
Automobile Workers Union which then included aircraft vor.<ers, or of his brother Victor; or of the Government in
which ran ike Isacore Lubin of the White House Staff, U.
wn, Robert R.R. Nathan and others of WFB.
Unions
Bouzlas
and Government, of course, contributed rightly to the
The interested reader ray consult a
aircraft effort,
. ■* .
rich literature on the war effort cited at reference ~ 24.
4
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As the U.S. entered the War the aircraft industry be¬
came an arsenal of democracy.

By 1943,

the U.S. aircraft

industry had become the largest industry in the world and
its product was one of the most crucial factors in winning
the war.
On January of 1942, President Roosevelt requested that
aircraft production be increased to 125,000 units in 1945.
Actual production in that year was 85,946 units.

But,

in terms of weight and performance, it produced more than
the equivalent because of the emphasis on the production
of heavier and faster aircraft.

The War Production Board

(WPB) Statistics reveals a dramatic shift of aircraft spe¬
cifications.

The WPB calculated plane output for the

period from 1941 to 1944 on the basis of the sizes, types
and proportions produced 1942.

The Board estimated that

aircraft production in 1943 was equivalent 122,000 1942type planes, and that the target of 100,000 units in 1944
would be equivalent of 167,000 1942-type planes.
the presidential goal was actually exceeded.

Thus,

This rapid

expansion was made possible by the huge U.S. war expendi¬
ture of about $200 billion, of which aircraft procurement,
- 20

excluding armaments, was about twenty five per cent.

The subject of greatest interest was production ef¬
ficiency, which increased approximately twenty-fold during
that period.

For the average monthly weight output per
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employee, which was 28 pounds in 1941, was 125 pound in
1944.
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Improvement of performance was more or less sta¬

bilized since there was no time to design, develop and
produce completely new models.
The Aircraft War Production Council(AWPC) produced an
interesting statistic on productivity.

The AWPC cited

the case history of a typical fighter plane from the first
to the thousandth unit.

Every doubling of the production

meant an increase of 75 per cent in productivity.

By

the time a thousand units had been produced productivity
increased by twentyfold.
Table 9.

(See Table 9-)

Productivity Improvement in Each Production Level

Number of Units

Change of types

Man-hours

1st

A

157,000

10th

A

59,000

13th

B

59,000

90th

3

50,000

C

26,500

C

19,500

100th

‘

700th
1000th

C-F

7,800

Source: R.M. Cleveland and F.P. Graham(eds.), The Aviation
Annual of 1945, Garden City: Doubleday , Doran &
Co., 1944, p. 78.
The production history of the four-engine bomber demon¬
strates the same point.

The first aircraft required

200,000 man-hours for construction: the 1,000th plane took
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22,500 and the 2,000th only 13,000.
tivity was increased sixteenfold.
productivity is price.

In this case produc¬
Another criterion of

Production costs in 1944 was

reduced by 20 to 40 per cent compared to the same plane
built in 1942.

Otherwise aircraft procurement would

have cost more than $15 billion.

For instance, in case

of the B-24, the government ordered 1,200 B-24s at $238,000
each in 1942.

But in 1944, 4,500 additional B-24 were

contracted at $137,000 each.

The saving involved was

roughly $100,000 on every B-24, amounted to half a billion
dollars.^

This dramatic improvement in efficiency was

due to the economies of scale as government procurement
increased explosively.
Table 10.

(See Table 10)

U.S. Aircraft Production
1939 to 1945
(Number of Aircrafts)
Military

Civil

Year

Total

1939

5,856

2,195

3,661

1940

12,813

6,028

6,785

1041

26,289

19,445

6,844

1942

47,675

47,675

—

1943

35,433

85,433

—

1944

95,272

95,272

—

1945

48,912

46,865

2,047

Source: A.erospace Industries Association of America, Aerospace Facts and Figures, Washington , D.C. , 195TT

p. 6.
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The crash development program produced favorable re¬
sults in a short time.

For instance, Curtiss-Wright Pro¬

peller Division produced hollow steel blades for combat use.
Hamilton Standard developed hydraulic pitch controls and
other major propeller manufacturers also greatly increased
research and development.

The most prominent innovators

were the Aeroproducts Division of General Motors and the
American Propeller Corporation.

In the instrument area,

Sperry Gyroscope, RCA, Western Electric, and Bendix develop¬
ed countless revolutionary devices such as automatic pilots
automatic gunsights, automatic bomb sights, and navigation
systems.
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Above all, a revolutionary device developed during the
war was the vast array of the subcontracting network.

The

factories best equipped to do a particular job did an•in¬
creasing share of the whole industry's work along those
lines, and accordingly increased the efficiency
tion.

of produc¬

Non-aviation subcontractors, who had reluctantly

accepted small orders, began to expand as they were assured
a high demand for a product which they had learned to make
efficiently.

They became, in effect, departments of prime

contractors.

Others shifted from making many items to

making a single or several units thus more efficiently.
At the same time prime contractors disposed of small depart¬
ments as they expand further.

,
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The net effect of this new system was profound:

First,

it put the aircraft industry on a mass-production basis.
Second, it made prime contractors basically the designers
and assemblers of aircrafts.

Prior to the war they had

turned raw materials into finished products.

But now they

are not aircraft builders or even engine, propeller, or in¬
strument producers in the prewar sense.

By 1944, about 60

per cent of the value of total production was added by sub¬
contractors.

The varied output of subcontractors were dir¬

ected into a score of narrowing channels, each representing
a different type of aircraft.

At prime contractors’

assem¬

bly lines, the multitude of airplanes parts built elsewhere
were checked, put together,

and tested.

enormous increase in productivity.

The result was an

^

As the war was neared its end, the reorganization of
the industry became a grave problem to all concerned.
1938,

In

the industry consisted of a total of 15 companies.

By 1940, this number had increased to 41 and in 1943 to 86
factories including 5 plants in Canada.

Total assets in¬

creased from $114 million in 1939 to $3.9 billion in 1944.
Working force increased from a meager 48,638 in 1939 to 2.1
million by the end of 1943.

Demobilization of this gigan¬

tic working force was just as difficult a task as the mobi¬
lization of it.

On V-J Day about $9 billion of contracts

were cancelled.

The net effect of cutback was the cancel-
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lation of approximately 90 per cent of existing contracts.
Accordingly 1.1 million workers were laid off.
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The effect of the unemployment caused by the aircraft
contract cancellation was of national concern, but the effect
upon the surplus problem was of particular interest to the
industry.

A total 100,000 aircrafts and 50,000 spare en¬

gines were expected to be declared surplus.

About 30 per

cent of the first 40,000 aircrafts declared surplus were
sold or leases.
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The industry expressed grave concern

over this matter.
It argued that although disposing surplus is the eco¬
nomic course to follow in the short run it results in in¬
efficiencies in the long run.

For example, World War I

Liberty engines were carried on the stock list until 1932.
The effect of this policy resulted in a halt of research
and development on liquid-cooled engines, because there was
no market for them.

Thus when the Second World War Broke

out the U.S. was far behind Europe just as it was 21 years
earlier at the time of World War I.

So was the case of the

Liberty-engined reconnaissance aircraft operating until
1935.

Thus the aircraft industry argued that the policy

of ’’holding on” to the surplus aircraft constituted a grave
27
menace to the technological progress of the industry.
It further contended that small research and experimen-
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tal contracts were not the solution to the pressing need
for keeping ahead in the world of aviation, because of the
time lag in development and production.

In another war

there would be no time to convert to wartime production as
had happened in the last two wars.

Therefore the produc¬

tion line is as essential as combat aircrafts in action.
As time lag becomes longer, as aircrafts become more and
more sophisticated and heavier, the thrust of this argument
becomes stronger.
The same argument holds for government owned facilities
and equipments.
ing the war,

Of the total of $3.7 billion expanded dur¬

$3.4 billion were federally financed.

Prewar

privately finance facilities were valued at $114 million.
Thus the government owned 90 per cent of the total facilities.

Most postwar commercial transports, however, were

modified wartime models with identical basic structure.
Since complete assembly lines for the production of these
were owned by the government, the industry could not produce
commercial airliners until these facilities were disposed
of.

These industry proposals were adopted by the govern¬

ment and thus became the cornerstone of the U.S. aircraft
industry.
By the end of 1945,

the government had cancelled con¬

tracts totaling $21.6 billion.

Industry sales declined

from a peak of $16 billion in 1944 to $1.2 billion in 1947
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and only 16 out of the 66 aircraft companies remained in
business.

The most significant effect of this cancellation

was on the rapid reduction in the employment level.

The

peak of 2.1 million was reduced to 1.5 million by V-E Day
(May 8,

1945) and to 519,000 by V-J Day(August 14,

1945).

A steady reduction continued until a bottom of 138,700 was
reached in 1946.
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The reduction of employment began even

before the war ended.

The expansion of production facili¬

ties ceased by the end of 1943 and airframe engine produc¬
tion after June,
uary,

1944;

and propeller production after Jan¬

1944.^

Accordingly the aircraft industry prepared for the con¬
version to a peace time economy.

Although civil aircraft

production rose to about 35,000 planes in 1946, nearly five
times that of the war year, military sales were still the
bulk of the industry sales.

It was important to achieve

a balanced production policy in the military sector.

Pro¬

cedures for orderly contract termination were adopted in
1943 and were incorporated into the Contract Settlement Act
of 1944.31
In order to avoid needless disruption on the indus¬
try when military requirements disappeared, the contract
termination process attempted to:
1.

Phase out the war contract as gradually as condi¬
tions permitted,
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2.

Prevent manufacturers and their subcontractors from
being left with vast quantities of unusable inven¬
tory , and

3.

Provide some assistance in reconverting to peace
time production.

The normal pattern was for the

subcontractors to cut back first, so that the industry gradually resumed its prewar structure.

32

By 1950 the employment of the aircraft industry recovered to 224,900.
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This representing one-sixth of that
o /

of 1944 and three times that of 1940.

And the industry

produced 6,200 units with a total value of $1.4 billion re¬
presenting one tenth of that of 1944.

In this process

many new companies disappeared but the old companies that
constituted the prewar industry remained.

Out of the fif¬

teen major companies only two companies, McDonnell Aircraft
corporation and Northrop Aircraft Incorporated were established during the war.

And of the major companies in

1940, only three Vega, Vultee, and Brewster failed to ap¬
pear on the 1950 list.

This shows a striking stability of

market share considering the erratic nature of demand.
In the jet engine field, however, prewar patterns of
the industry have been greatly disturbed.

Nonaircraft com¬

panies, General Electric and Westinghouse, were granted
government funds for research and development of jet-engines
during the war while the established engine makers were re-

91

quired to concentrate on reciprocating engines.

Consequent¬

ly the former took an early lead in jet engine production.
The crippled aircraft industry after World War II re¬
covered instantly as the Korean War broke out in June, 1950.
Military aircraft production increased from 2,600 units in
1949 to 9,000 units in 1953 and the floorspace utilized was
doubled.
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This drastic change is shown in the following

table 11.
Table 11.

*

U.S. Aircraft Production
1946-1956
(Number of Aircrafts)
Military

Civil

Year

Total

1946
1947
1948
1949

36,418
17,739
9,838
6,137

1,147
2,122
2,536
2,592

35,001
15,617
7,302
3,545

1950
1951
1952
1953

6,200
7,532
10,640
13,112

2,680
5,055
7,131
8,978

3,520
2,477
3,509
4,134

1954
1955
1956

11,478
11,484
12,408

8,089
6,664
5,203

3,389
4,820
7,205

Source: Aerospace Industries Association of America, Aero¬
space Facts and Figures, Washington, D.C., 1963,p.
Much of production increase was achieved by utilizing
branch plants and by subcontracting work.

The reason was

that the government was reluctant to finance new investment
when it already possessed much idle floor space and equip-

7.
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ment.
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Aircraft manufacturers, on the other hand,

found

wartime facilities poorly suited for larger jet aircraft
production.
sulted in a

Thus, the decrease in government finance re¬
larger private investment.

This was also fa¬

cilitated by the Defense Production Act of 1950, which allow¬
ed producers to amortize new investment over a five-year
period for tax purposes.
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One of the reasons for such

obsolescence was the increase in size and weight of the air¬
planes.

Also the need for additional land space around plants
became acute as the jet engine was introduced.

Runways

designed for propeller driven aircraft were no longer suit¬
able.

Extending the old runways was often impractical be¬

cause of a noise problem and the development which had al¬
ready taken place around them.

All in all, these events

necessitated a large amount of private capital investment.
The following table shows clearly that the private sector
spent more during this period than it did during World War
II period.
There were three reasons why the industry invested its
own money rather than wait for the government to invest.
First,

the government refused to finance expansion so long

as usable facilities existed.

Second, there was a huge de¬

mand for new machine tools requiring further development.
The government preferred to employ its facility contracts
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Table 12.

Cost of Emergency Facilities Expansion
(Millions of Dollars)

Types of Investment
Structures

Equipment

Types of Finance

1940-1945

1950-1953

Private

212

805

Federal

1,344

280

Private

208

399

Federal

2,130

2,044

Source: R. Modley and T.S. Cawley, Aviation Facts and Fig¬
ures , 1953, Washington, Lincoln Press, Inc.” 1953,

p"! Tl.
to further machine tool development and to pay for the in¬
stallation of some of this equipment.

As a result of this

policy the government financed much of the new equipment,
making the industry concentrate upon expanding other facili¬
ties.

Third, the government offered accelerated deprecia¬

tion during the Korean War as it did during World War IX.
This became the most powerful incentive for a firm to plow
back its earning, although the straight five-year period
was not quite as attractive as the World War II period of
five years or the duration of the war which ever was
shorter.

39

Accordingly, unless the government finances rixed
assets, the industry must maintain them to meet the unpre¬
dictable cyclical swings in production.

Such a capital

structure would be a costly burden to both the private and
public sectors in the long run.

Therefore, the industry

has been extremely cautious about expanding facilities oe
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yond the point which they can be profitably employed during
the low swings of the aircraft procurement cycle.

For in¬

stance, during both wars, sales increased at a much faster
rate than did fixed assets as shown in the following Graph 1.
This is mainly due to the government policy on aircraft
procurement.

Graph 1.

Net Book Value of Facilities and Sales of 12
Major Airframe Companies, 1937-1954

Source: Aerospace Industries Association of America, ^ Avia- ^
tion Facts and Figures, Washington, D.C., 1955, p. 83
There was the belief held throughout the industry that
earnings were much too low to justify risky investment.
Graph 2 shows earnings as a percentage of sales for 12 major

95

aircraft companies during the periods.

Earnings as a per¬

centage of networth climbed much faster because of the wide
employment of government-owned facilities.

"Graph 2.

1936

Financial Ratios of 12 Major Aircraft
Companies, 1937-1954

1938

1940

1942

1944

1946

1948

I9S0

>932

1954

Source: Aerospace Industries Association of America, Avia¬
tion Facts and Figures, Washington, D.C., 1955, p. 84.

Government financing, however, provided government
officials with an extremely potent control over the indus¬
try.

Control factor was as a means of forcing the prime

contractors to accept subcontracting in lieu of new plant
construction.
Government financing was predominant throughout the
industry.

The reasons are following:

First, the aircraft

industry, which had paid out 50 per cent of its eamings in
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dividends, was in no position to tie up funds in non-productive plants and equipment.
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This dividend payout ratio

is minimum since, the profit margin of the industry is sub¬
stantially lower than that of other manufacturing industries.
Second, even if the government allowed profit margins to in¬
crease, the rapid expansion during a war would still require
a huge public expenditure.

However, there were few licensing arrangements as dur¬
ing World War II.

Indeed the only two instances of major

licensing were the formation of the B-47 pool with Boeing
as the "design prime" and Lockheed and Douglas as the other
prime contractors; and the Republic Aviation-General Motors
agreement.42
licensing.

There were two reasons for this absence of
First,

the over-all production never reached

the World War II level.

The peak production in 1953 was

about 150 million pounds compared with 962 million pounds
/ Q

in 1944.

Second, the 1939 expansion commenced with 9.5

million square feet of floor space.being used whereas the
Korean requirement were supported by an initial operating
plant of over 60 million square feet plus a considerable
number of government-owned reserve plants.

44

Therefore,

subcontracting, with its greater flexibility, had more ap¬
peal than the licensing arrangement for both concerned
parties.
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3. BIRTH OF AEROSPACE ERA

Following the Korean War, the aircraft industry has
experienced fundamental changes, namely the emergence of
guided missiles and rapid expansion of space procurement.
On October 4,

1957, the Soviet Russia sent the first man¬

made object into orbit.
ican public.

Russian success shocked the Amer¬

Soon the National Aeronautics and Space Ad¬

ministration (NASA) came into being in the fall of 1958.
Drawing initially from the defunct National Advisory Com¬
mittee for Aeronautics(NACA), the Navy Vanguard team, and
the Army Jet Propulsion Laboratory, NASA grew into a large
well organized unit by mid-1962 with a clearly defined goal
of landing men on the moon, and returning them safely before
the Russians did.^

Because of their superior speed in the delivery of
destructive power, missiles are considered a superior sub¬
stitute for aircraft.

Accordingly, the military aircraft

market contracted abruptly while the missile market was ex¬
panding sharply.

If the aircraft industry was to survive,

it became obvious that either it diversify into other areas
and expand its civil aircraft market or it had to adapt
their production to missiles , the latter being the mere
feasible alternative.
challenge quickly.
Association,

Inc.

The industry responded to the new
In 1959,

the U.S. Aircraft Industries

changed its name to Aerospace Industries
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Association of America, Inc., to reflect the changing na¬
ture of the effort.

However,

the transition to aerospace

industry was not without its difficulties.

The facilities for aircraft production were no longer
economical for missile production.

For instance, high-

ceiling areas meant wasted space if they were to convert to
missile production.

This meant more adventurous capital

investment in the private sector in order to survive in the
new bom industry.

In addition, missile production caused

a great deal of change in the nature of labor force.

Old

jobs were destroyed and new ones were created as high tech¬
nology was achieved.

Between 1954 and 1962 the percentage

of hourly production workers dropped from 71.6 per cent to
40 per cent of total employment as the proportion of more
complex products increased.^

The aircraft industry, however, was able to adapt to
the challenge imposed by the advent of the missiles.

The

following table 13 shows the new pattern of development.
The six largest military contractors were also the largest
contractors of missiles.

Accordingly, high military sales

levels depended upon capturing large missile contracts as
the proportion of missile contracts in the defense procure¬
ment rapidly increased.

For instance, Boeing became the

second largest military contractor largely due to its suc¬
cessful missiles program while Douglas fell from number one
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Table 13.

Composition of Missile Sales in Military Sales
of Nine Major Prime Contractors in Percentage

Comp any

Year

Boeing

1956
1961

36.8

11.1

Chance-Vought

1956
1961

37.3
3.9

3.5
0.1

Convair

1956
1961

20.6
46.1

9.1
15.5

Douglas

1956
1961

1.4
39.3

1.0
3.9

Lockheed

1956
1961

69.4

17.3

Martin

1956
1961

9.7
87.5

2.3
13.6

McDonnell

1956
1961

2.8
18.9

0.4
1.4

North-American

1956
1961

0.01
40.3

--

1956
1961

33.7
35.5

.

Northrop

Missile Sales/
Military Sales

Missile Mar¬
ket Share

_—

10.3
7.3
1.2

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Statistical Abstracts of the United States, Washington", D. C. , 1959,
I960, 19'6i:
to six because of not being able to do so.
Accordingly,

(See iable 13)

the structure of the aerospace industry

has undergone substantial changes.

Although the industry

is principally made up of the same old companies, many new
concerns entered into aerospace activities.

Electronic
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manufacturers became a much more important part of the aero¬
space industry in some instances even becoming the prime
contractors for new weapon systems.

On the other hand,

some aircraft companies such as Chance-Vought and Douglas
which did not have the foresight to prepare for the transi¬
tion into aerospace ended up as subcontractors to the more
successful ones.

In some instances conroanies were faced

either merger or bankruptcy because of their inability to
adapt to the new pattern of government procurement policy.

Until the middle of 1950's aircraft companies were
usually supplied with government furnished equipment(GFE)
e.g.

engines, propellers,

and bombsights.

The companies

would then assemble the complete aircraft and deliver it
to the military service.

They virtually had no further

relationship with the delivered aircraft, unless it was re¬
turned for improvements or modifications.
program, however,
ment

In the missile

aerospace companies were given full manage¬

responsibility in most cases.

Not only did the com¬

panies assemble the finished missiles but they also designed
the ground-support equipment to make it usable.

They ma¬

naged deliveries of components and arranged production
schedules under military supervision.

They participated

in selecting launching sites and were even involved in the
actual site construction.
operational,

And when the missiles became

field-service representatives of the airframe,
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engine and guidance-systems producers accompanied military
personnel as trouble shooter.
Consequently,

47

customer-producer familiarity, as well

as highly technically qualified personnel and related pro¬
duction experience became keys to retaining the ever in¬
creasing volume of missile procurements.

The aircraft com¬

panies had an excellent foundation to start with.

The air¬

craft companies, however, were in more competitive environ¬
ment than they had ever been before,

Until then, previous

experience in aircraft production was a prerequisite for an
invitation to compete for such a government contract.
the government side,

On

this procedure assures predictable per¬

formance of producer.

Hence, the market was closed to new¬

comers because experience could not be gained without pro¬
duction, but production requires experience.
duction of the missile, however,

The intro¬

changed the whole picture

since experience no longer provided such an insurmountable
barrier to new competition.

In some cases, electronic pro¬

ducers were found to be better qualified technologically
than aircraft producers.

By 1956, non-aircraft producers

were prime contractors on 10 of 26 missile projects.
This advent of the missile also rapidly devastated
capital bases of the aircraft industry.

Old facilities

for aircraft production became technologically obsolete for
missile production.

Once again an extensive inflow of

102

capital was needed from the private sector.

From 1956

to 1961 the industry spent about $2 billion on facilities
for the development and production of missiles.

In case of missile production,
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the degree of concentra¬

tion is even higher than that of aircraft production.
fact,

In

the top five companies- Lockheed, Convair, Martin, Boe¬

ing, and North

American- accounted for 91.5 per cent of

missiles produced by aircraft companies and 68.3 per cent
of the entire missile procurement.^
aircraft industry steadily increased.

Missile sales by the
Meanwhile, the

structure of industry sales had changed too.

Missile

sales accounted for 44.4 per cent of the total industry
sales in 1961 compared with 5.7 per cent in 1956.

Also

the ratio of aircraft industry missile sales to total
missile sales increased from 23.5 per cent in 1956 to 74.7
per cent in 1961.^
The aircraft industry's success in missiles can be
attributed to its experience in responding to public po-.
licy and its established position in handling government
business.

By the time the aircraft industry was well

transformed into the aerospace industry in the early 1960's,
the top six military aircraft producers were also well en¬
trenched as major missile producers.

Thus the most signi¬

ficant feature of the U.S. aerospace industry in this per¬
iod was probably this "resilient response" to rapidly
changing public policy.^

103

Table 14.

U.S. Aerospace Industry Sales by Customer
1957 to 1976
(Billions of Dollars)

-

Aerospace Products and Services

Year

Total
Sales

U.S. Government
NASA and
DOD
Others

1957
1958
1959

15.9
16.1
16.6

12.8
13.2
13.2

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964

17.3
18.0
19.2 .
20.1
20.6

1965
1966
1967
1968
1969

Other
customers

Non-Aerospace Pro¬
ducts and
Services

0.1

1.6
1.4
1.8

1.4
1.4
1.5

13.2
13.9
14.3
14.2
13.2

0.4
0.6
1.3
2.6
3.6

2.2
1.9
1.8
1.5
2.0

1.6
1.6
1.7
1.3
1.7

20.7
24.6
27.3
29.0
26.1

11.4
13.3
15.9
16.6
15.8

4.5
5.0
4.2
3.9
3.3

2.8
3.7
4.6
5.9
4.3

2.0
2.6
2.6
2.5
2.7

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974

24.9
22.2
22.8
24.8
26.4

14.6
12.6
13.3
12.9
12.7

3.0
2.7
2.6
2.4
2.5

4.6
4.3
4.3
6.2
7.2

2.6
2.5
2.6
3.3
4.1

1975
1976

28.4
29.3

13.1
13.4

2.7
2.8

7.7
7.8

4.8
5.3

Source: Aerospace Industries Association of America, Aerospace Facts and Fizures 1977/1978, Washington"! ETC. ,
1977, p. 9T
aerospace
Th:is resili ence and creative response of the
early
in dus t ry, how eve r, was to be tested again in the
1970’s.

After the Vietn am war military procurement was

on in
reduced to $12.6 billion in 1971 from $16.6 billi
1968.52

Also NASA contracts were reduced to $2.4 billion
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Table 15.

U.S. Aerospace Sales and the National Economy
1960 to 1976
(Billions of Dollars)

Sales
Total Gross
Year

National Product

Manufacturing
Industries

Durable
Goods Industry

Aeroso,
Goods
dus try

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964

506
523
564
595
636

346
353
390
413
443

174
175
196
209
226

17
18
19
20
21

1965
1966
1967
1968
1969

688
753
796
869
936

492
554
575
632
695

257
292
301
336
367

21
25
27
29
26

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974

982
1,063
1,171
1,306
1,414

709
751
850
1,017
1,061

363
383
436
527
529

25
22
23
25
26

1975
1976

1,516
1,692

1,047
1,183

527
605

28
29

Source: Gross National Product, Manufacturing,and Durable
Goods Industries: Department of Commerce, Survey of
Current Business; Aerospace Industries Association,
Aerosoace Facts and Figures 1977/1978, Washington,
D.C. ,‘ 1977, p. 12.
in 1973 from 5 billion dollars in 1966 as the Apollo project
phased out.^ (See Table 14)

To make matters worse, domes¬

tic demand for commercial transport became soft as airline
profits deteriorated.

Increased fuel costs and wages cou¬

pled with the higher price tag of wide-body jets can only
hurt already depressed market.

As a result of this,

the
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proportion of the aerospace industry in the gross national
products steadily decreased.

Table 16.

U.S. Exports and Exports of Aerospace Products
1960 to 1976
(Billions of Dollars)

Total Exports
Year

(See Table 15)

of U.S.

Exports of Aerospace Products
Total

Merchandise

Civil
Transport

Civil
Others

Military

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964

20.4
20.8
20.4
23.1
26.2

1.7
1.7
1.9
1.6
1.6

0.5
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.2

0.6
0.6
0.7
0.5
0.6

0.6
0.8
1.0
0.9
0.8

1965
1966
1967
1968
1969

27.1
29.9
31.1
34.2
37.5

1.6
1.7
2.2
3.0
3.1

0.4
0.4
0.6
1.2
0.9

0.5
0.6
0.8
1.1
1.1

0.8
0.6
0.9
0.7
1.1

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974

42.6
43.5
49.0
70.2
97.2

3.4
4.2
3.8
5.1
7.1

1.3
1.6
1.1
1.7
2.7

1.2
1.5
1.8
2.1
2.6

0.9
1.1
• 0.8
1.4
1.8

1975
1976

106.1
113.3

7.8
7.9

2.4
2.5

2.9
3.2

2.5
2.2

Sources: Bureau of the Census, '’U.S. Exports, Schedule B,
Commodity and Country,” Report FT 410, ’’Highlights
of U.S. Export and Import Trade," Report FT 990.
Thus, the only alternative left to the aerospace in¬
dustry was to extend foreign markets.

Fortunately, con¬

centration of wealth due to the oil crisis turned out to
be a favorable factor for this case.

The exports of aero¬

space products increased to $7.9 billion in 1976 from $1.7
billion in only ten years.

(See Table 16)
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But this time both defense and state departments offi¬
cials became anxious for various reasons.

First,

the con¬

sequence of exporting military aircraft was not as simple
as that of exporting lollypops.

This may tilt the balance

of power in any particular region.

A friend of today may

become an enemy of tomorrow and vice versa.

Second, as the proportion of exports increases, the
management of the aerospace industry tends to become less
dependent on the government procurement.
in accord with government policy.

This may not be

Consequently, the govern¬

ment began to interfere in the exporting procedure, in full
scale.

However,

the U.S.

aerospace industry is not in the

same dominant position in the world market as it once was.
The U.S. marketshare of the world market is reduced from
86 per cent in 1960 to 68 per cent in 1975 and is projected
to 60 per cent by 1985.^

European and Japanese aerospace

industries as well as of Soviet Russia are increasingly com¬
petitive in both quality and price.
the U.S.

The vacuum left by

aerospace suppliers was swiftly filled by the firm

in the above countries.

In the long run,

therefore, res¬

trictive export policy on aerospace products may only weaken
the dominant position of the U.S.
world market.

aerospace industry in the
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CHAPTER IV.
1.

THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICY ON THE EXPORTS OF
THE AEROSPACE INDUSTRY

INTRODUCTION

If the story of the U.S. aerospace industry is a suc¬
cess story, then that of its British counterpart is a sad
one.

However, it is our proposition that public policy of

both governments played an equally dominant role in deter¬
mining the destiny of the industry in each country.

As recent as the 1950's, the British aircraft industry
was well ahead of its U.S. counterpart.

This is exempli¬

fied by the 3ritish Comet, the first commercial jet trans¬
port which went into airline service in 1952.

This was a

full six years ahead of a similar American aircraft, the
Boeing 707.
Such a lead is vital in securing a market3hare for
once an airline establishes an association with a particu¬
lar aircraft manufacturer, it rarely breaks away.

An air¬

line’s loyalty is based on economic reasoning to protect
its investment.

In the piston-engine era it was easier

than at the present for an airline to change its fleet.
However, with the coming of the jet airliner, airlines
found it virtually impossible to switch from one manutacturer to another since stocking huge inventories ar.c tram-
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ing maintenance staffs for a new airliner are prohibitively
high.

The British aircraft industry, however, failed to

capitalize on its vital lead due to the indecisiveness of
the government about the fatal crashes of the Comet.

By the time the Comet reentered the world market, all
the major airlines were already committed to either Boeing
or Douglas.^

So the British tried to recoup the market

with the VC-10 which has a wider body and a longer range
than the Boeing 707 or DC-8.

At that time the British

government made it clear that it would not import any more
jet transports for its own airlines.

But this was sudden¬

ly changed when BOAC cancelled its order on the basis of
the higher operating cost of the VC-10, which had completed
its maiden flight.

It later became apparent that this

decision was based upon insufficient information since
passengers preferred the roomier and more comfortable
VC-10.

Since that time the British aircraft industry

has never regained its technological superiority to the
U.S.

aerospace industry.

2

One of the main reasons for the failure of British air¬
craft industry was the feud between the Ministry of the Civil
Aviation and the Ministry of Supply.

Their constant fric¬

tions created too many stop-go decisions which resulted in
too many prototypes and too few production models .

In par-
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ticular, the inefficiency of the Ministry of Supply which
bought the airliners and sold them to the airlines was the
prime weakness.^
Another reason for the success of the U.S. and failure
of the British was the fact that the U.S. aerospace industry
had exclusive access to the huge U.S.

domestic market.

British industry did not have this advantage.

The

About half

of the world’s air transport operations were in the U.S.^
and penetration into this market by non U.S. firms has been
almost impossible.

This barrier existed even before the

U.S. aerospace industry had attained any technological lead
over its British counterparts.

The relationship between

industry and government in the U.S. and the resulting pub¬
lic policy played a crucial role in building this barrier.

As discussed in the preceeding chapter, many types of
restrictions other than tariffs can be imposed upon the aero¬
space imports.

For instance, when Eastern Airlines announ¬

ced that it was going to lease four A-300s for the purpose
of evaluation in 1977, the International Trade Commission
immediately investigated the terms of the lease.^

Many

Europeans were convinced that the loss of the Western Air¬
lines order for Airbus Industrie A-300, and refusal of the
New York landing rights for the Anglo-French Concorde super¬
sonic transport are based on less obvious government and in¬
dustry pressures,^
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On the other hand,

the British aerospace industry is

characterized by a series of constant stop-goes, stemming
from its abrasive and displeasing relationship with succes¬
sive Cabinets.

This may be caused by the manner in which

the British system of government works.

The British sys¬

tem of government has ministers drawn from the Members of
Parliament, who are professional politicians, while the
senior civil servants are traditionally drawn from the Ci¬
vil Service.

These along with the abrasive relationship

between government and industry, make it extremely difficult
to form sophisticated decisions such as an advanced fighter
bomber project.

One of the consequences of this situation

is the thrash-about in the early stages of any new govern¬
ment . ^
In the U.S.,

the Executive Branch is basically run by

professional administrators who are less political in deci¬
sion-making than professional politicians.

Also the U.S.

can finance more projects simultaneously and afford more
mistakes which are inevitable in any frontier technology.
The jobs resulting from aerospace projects are significant
factors in decision making process when the public sector
can afford the burden.

Accordingly,

the labor unions have

always been fervent supporters of the aerospace industry.
However,

if the public sector cannot afford the cost, as in

Britain,

it becomes a totally different situation. The difler-

ent relationships between the government and the industry ol
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the U.S.

and that of Britain presents an opportunity to

test the validity of the dynamic externality theory dis¬
cussed in Chapter 3.

2.

PUBLIC POLICY; A KEY EXTERNAL DETERMINANT

At the end of World War II,

the British aircraft indus¬

try was in an ideal position to dominate the world market.
In 1944, the industry was employing 1.8 million workers.
Over 166,000 Rolls-Royce Merlin engines were built which
amounted to more than any other engine built in aviation hiso

tory.

The first aircraft with a jet engine flew in 1941

and the first production model of a jet-powered aircraft,
Meteor, flew in 1944.

The U.S. had to buy 400 Canberras

when the U.S. industry could not produce what the Department
of Defense wanted.
Furthermore, British commercial aircrafts were being
manufactured on a substantial scale.

The Viking in parti¬

cular, achieved much success in the European market while
the sales of the Dove totaled 550, of which one sixth had
been sold to the U.S.
exceeded 150.

The sales of the four-engined Heron

This is an indication of the technological

lead of the British aircraft industry at that time.

10

However, after the fatal crashes of the Comet in 1954,
the British aircraft industry lost its lead in technology to
the U.S.

The reasons were clear:

First, because of the

friction among governmental agencies there were many projects
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which rarely went beyond the prototype stage.

Also an in¬

consistent public policies taken by a frequently changing Ca¬
binets contributed to the disarray.

Frightened by the alarm¬

ing level of deficit in budget and the balance of payments,
any incoming Cabinet would be tempted to delete appropria¬
tions for aerospace research and development which was large
enough to affect the fiscal position.^
Second, the expenditures on aerospace research and de¬
velopment actually decreased: the first available data for
this purpose was 138 million pounds in 1961, and 159 million
pounds in 1971.

12

Considering the devaluations of the pound

during that period and the inflation, real funds available
for research and development actually steadily decreased.

Third,

the two research institutions established to ad¬

vise the aircraft industry were mainly concerned with pure
research, and not the practical problems of production.
Originally the Aerodynamics Department of the National Phy¬
sical Laboratory dealt with the theoretical issues while the
Royal Aircraft Factory actually built the aircraft and the
engines until World War I.

The industry, however, grew

jealous of the factory's position and exerted sufficient
pressure to halt the factory work.
renamed,

The institution was then

the Royal Aircraft Establishment(RAE).

The RAE

was to provide aerodynamic information on current aircraft
problems and research on advanced aircraft design.

The FAE,
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however, was not permitted to produce the aircraft itself.
This placed the RAE in an unfortunate position for it had
to advise the industry without being fully aware of some
of the major problems faced by the manufacturers.

13

Fourth, the British domestic market for aerospace
products was limited compared to that of the U.S.

Other

countries with this problem were forced to purchase U.S.
aircraft which gave them a great advantage of a well-spread
out overhead development cost.
market, however,

The size of the domestic

is not an unsurmountable barrier,

it poses a serious obstacle.

although

For instance, Swiss watch

makers with a small domestic market have long taken over
the world market.

But in order to overcome this, a coun¬

try with a small domestic market such as Britain should
have limited the scope of the industry and concentrated on
a specific portion of the market.

This might have increased

their technical edge over the competitors.
Finally, the entangled government relationship is no
less important than any of the other problems.

The Mini¬

stry of Aviation was responsible for civil aerospace and the
procurement of military aircraft prior to 1967.

These func¬

tions were assumed by the Ministry of Technology and the Mi¬
nistry of Defense.

In 1970,

the Ministry of Technology and

Board of Trade became part of the Department of Trade and

118

industry.

Although that Department continued the Board of

Trade's responsibility for civil aviation,

the Ministry of

Technology's responsibility for aerospace research,

develop¬

ment and procurement and sponsorship of the aerospace indus¬
try was transferred to a separate and temporary Ministry of
Aviation Supply.

In 1971, the Ministry of Aviation Supply was replaced
by the Ministry of State

for Defense.

A Ministrial Aero¬

space Board is to be set up consisting of the Secretaries of
State for Defense and Trade and Industry, to oversee collab¬
oration between the two departments and became the authority
for instructions and policy guidance on the industry.^
This makeshift public policy and scattered responsibility im¬
peded the development of the aerospace industry in which pa¬
tient support and understanding is necessary.

Whenever, a

new institution took over the responsibility of overseeing
the industry,

it was more concerned with the imputation of

what went wrong rather than how to solve the problem under
these circumstances.

Nobody wanted to take the risk of pro¬

moting a daring new project.

In the long run,

this probably

hurt the British aerospace industry more than anything else.

The British government which was desperate to rejuvenate
its troubled aerospace industry, combined more than a dozen
firms into two major airframe manufacturers and one engine
manufacturer in 1974.^

British Aircraft Corporation ana
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Hawker-Siddeley are concerned with airframe manufacturing
and Rolls Royce with engine manufacturing.

Finally two air¬

frame manufacturers were merged into the British Aerospace
Corporation in 1977.

^

All of this demonstrates the crucial role of public po¬
licy in the development of the aerospace industry.
saw above,

As we

these five critical factors are directly and in¬

directly affected by public policy.

In most cases of model

building public policy tends to be left out as an external
factor since there is no way to quantify public policy.

For

instance, how could one quantify the impact of Sandy's Defense
White Paper, which indicated that the manned fighter was dead
and that in the future reliance would be placed on missiles?
Yet the impact of this paper on the British aerospace indus¬
try, which

was

disregarded

by

the

ment later,

can hardly be exaggerated.

British

govem-

However, any model

which leaves out such an important external factor as govern¬
ment policy is likely to be unrealistic.
is included,

If public policy

its effects are difficult to quantify directly.

Thus an appropriate way to consider public policy is to em¬
ploy a historical method of analysis where relevant.

This

is probably the most we need to consider in the decision mak¬
ing process, since decision making is basically dicnotomical
no matter how sophisticated it may look.
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3.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY

Defense and space policies dictate the bulk of research
and development activities in the U.S. due to the fact that
the technological advancement of weapon systems is crucial
to national security.

Unintentionally, however, these pub¬

lic policies affect the whole economy in various ways.

Its

impact on the U.S. aerospace export is substantial, although
this is not limited to the aerospace industry.

Keesing has stated that there is a powerful correlation
between the intensity of E&D activity in American industries
and their export performance.
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Also a Brookings study in¬

dicated that technology is the key determinant of the rate
of production and general economic progress.

That does

not mean that other factors such as inflation, wage differen¬
ces, and foreign exchange rate do not affect the export posi¬
tion .

Pc t, as far as aerospace exports are concerned, tech¬

nological advancement is the single most important factor and
the public policy on

R&D

directs it.

The U.S. aerospace industry receives about one half of
all of the federal expenditure on

nil-

con cruets 25 per cent of all industrial

This incus try a.sc
huD'

for 21 ter cent of the total sa~es of the

.

Tsis accounts
>

aercapa ■

.

cue try 'lee Table 17,
. ce incortance of research and development to tr.e :

o .s-
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Table 17.

U.S. Industrial Research and Development;
All Industries and the Aerospace Industry
1960 to 1975
(Billions of Dollars)

All Industries
Year

R 6c D

Aerospace Industry R & D

Aerospace

Total Government Private

Sales

1960

10.5

3.5

3.2

.4

17.3

1965

14.2

5.1

4.5

.6

20.7

1970

18.1

5.2

4.0

1.2

24.9

1975

23.5

5.7

4.5

.2

28.4

Sources:

Compiled from National Science Foundation, Research
and Development in Industry, Washington, D.C., 1967,
1973, 1975.

try is also portrayed by the structure of employment.

As of

1976, the U.S. aerospace industry employed 19 per cent of all
scientists and engineers in the country.

At the peak of the

indus try in 1965, it employed 29 per cent of the total.

(See

Table 18 )
Table 18.

Employment of Scientists and Engineers for
Research and Development in the U.S.
1960 to 1975
(As of December 31 of each Year)

Year

Tatal

Aerospace

1960

292,000

72,400

24.8

1965

343,600

99,200

28.9

1970

384,100

92,600

24.1

1975

360,400

67.600

18.8

Aerospace/Total
d)

Source: Compiled from National Science Foundation, Research
and Development in Industrv, Washington, D.C.,1967,
1973, 1$75"
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This concentration of scientists and engineers in the indus¬
try is understandable since the growth of the industry total¬
ly depends upon its technological capability.
most industries,

More than

the aerospace industry's sales have direct¬

ly resulted from its research and development activity.
Much of industrial research and development activities, how¬
ever,

focused on product improvement and applied areas.

Thus most of the basic research and high risk - high cost
activities in the aerospace area have to rely upon government
finance.

In this regard,

a very fortunate situation.

the U.S.

aerospace industry is in

About SO per cent of aerospace

research arid development is funded by the Federal Government,
This is 20 times the proportion that the British aerospace industry is assisted by the British Government.
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Table 19 shows the the trend in expenditure the U.S.
aerospace research and development and that of Britain.

It

seems inevitable that with such a tremendous edge in public
expenditure on research and development,

the U.S. aerospace

industry would surpass its British counterpart.

However,

#

one should also note that the proportion of the U.S. aero¬
space research and development expenditure to that of the
total industry is steadily decreasing over time.

This trend

was noticeable since 1969 when the U.S. aerospace research
and development expenditure actually decreased,
ly,

the productivity of the industry stabilized.

Consequent-
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Table 19.

Research and Development Expenditure in the
U.S. and Britain
1956 to 1975
(Billions of Dollars)

Year

U.S.
Total

1956

U.S.
Aerospace

British
Aerospace

6.6

2.2

N. A.

1960

10.5

3.5

.3

1.8

1965

14.2

5.1

.3

2.6

1070

18.1

5.2

.2

2.6

1975

23.5

5.7

.5

N. A.

British
Total
.8

Sources: Compiled from, Central Statistical Office, Annual
Abstract of Statistics, 1955-1976, Her Majesty * s
Stationery Office, London; Aerospace Industries
Association of America, Aerospace Facts and Figures,
Washington, D.C,, 1959, 1963,19 777

Owing to the spurt of technological advancement, aero¬
space exports increased not only in terms of absolute amount
but also in relative proportion to total export.
In particular,

(See Table 20)

the proportion of the aerospace exports to

the U.S. net balance of trade becomes increasingly important
as the balance of trade deteriorates.

As a matter of fact,

the national interest of monopolizing a superior weapon sys¬
tem and that of earning valuable foreign exchange have been
constantly conflicting with each other.

So whenever the

balance of trade position gets weak, the latter position be¬
comes strongert

and vice versa.

This conflict is inevitable

since aerospace exports in 1976 accounted for 45 per cent of
all shipments by the U.S.

aerospace industry and provided

170,000 full-time jobs according to the U.S.

Commerce Depart-

124

Table 20.

U.S. Total Exports and Aerospace Exports
1946 to 1975

(A) Total
Exports

Year

(B)Aerospace
Exports

B/A(%)

Aerospace Trade Bal
ance as Percent of
U.S. Trade

1946
1950

9.5
10.1

.12
.24

1.2
2.4

2.6
14.2

1955
1960

15.4
20.6

.73
1.33

4.7
6.5

17.4
31.0

1965
1970

27.3
42.6

1.47
3.40

5.4
8.0

24.9
109.3

1975

106.1

7.79

7.3

73.2

Sources : Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the
U.S., 1976,1956, Aerosp ace Facts and Figures, Washington, D. C., 1963, 197 7. p. 107T
ment statistics.

Overall aerospace exports in 1977, valued

at approximately $8.4 billion, will be the largest single
contributor to the U.S. balance of trade, accounting for $8
billion after- offsetting imports.
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The most interesting aspect of the aerospace export mar¬
ket is yet to be explained.

Once the U.S. aerospace indus¬

try attained a comparatively advantageous position in the
market,

there is no compelling reason to reverse this,

for

European countries, according to the comparative advantage
theory,

can benefit most from concentrating in what they are

relatively best at.

However,

the European countries did

exactly the opposite of what comparative advantage theory ex¬
pected them to do.

And the result was successful!

This

suggests that comparative advantage theory is insufficient
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Table 21.

Productivity in the Aerospace Industries
1960 to 1972
(Constant 1970 U.S. dollars)

Year

U.S.

Britain

France

Germanv

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964

16,132
16,421
15,088
15,891
17,034

4,129
4,694
4,471
4,637
5,362

9,329
9,123
9,455
9,745
11,314

N. A.
N. A.
N. A.
N.A.
N. A.

1965
1966
1967
1968
1969

17,591
17,898
18,374
19,280
18,635

6,286
6,571
6,264
6,512
6,952

10,121
10,906
12,318
11,290
12,023

6,597
5,114
10,031
11,144
10,455

1970
1971
1972
1972

21,381
23,329
26,907
27,810

6,409
7,036
6,863
7,045

12,451
13,074
13,946
18,098

13,125
15,485
18,773
23,204

Sources: Compiled from Aerospace Industries Association of
America, Aerospace Facts and Figures 1975/1976,
Washington, D.C. , pp. 9, 123,188; Interavia, May
1969, p. 517, December, 1970, p. 1501 May 1971,
p. 513; July 1972, p. 751; June 1975, p. 616;
September 1975, p. 952; September 1976, p. 825;
British Industry Today, Aerospace, H.M.S.O.,
London, 1972, pp. 5-7.
at best, in explaining the behavioral patterns of the air¬
craft industry in foreign trade.
Table 21 shows the productivity of the aerospace
industries in four countries.

Productivity is defined in

terms of the total real industry sales divided by the total
employment of the industry of each country.

This indicates

that the productivity of the U.S. aerospace industry is the
highest among the four.

However, this also points out that
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the productivity of the French and German aerospace indus¬
try increased faster than that of the U.S. aerospace indus¬
try.
Table 22.

Year

Research and Development Expenditures
1961 to* 1973
(Billions of Dollars)
U. S.

France

R & D Public
(%)

West Germany

R 6c D Public
(%)

R 6c D Public
(%)

Britain
R&D PuDlic
(%)

1961

14.6

66

1.0

64

1.8

45

1.8

58

1963

17.4

72

1.3

64

1.4

49

2.2

54

1966

22.3

68

2.2

70

2.2

49

2.6

52

1970

26.9

55

3.2

70

3.0

47

2.7

51

1973

30.6

55

6.0

70

Sources: Compiled from UNESCO, Science Policy and Organiza¬
tion of Research in the Federal Republic of^Germany,
pT 58; Science Policy News, January 1970; Science
News, 1970; OECD, A Study of'Resources Devotee to
R & D in OECD Member Countries in 1963-1964, Paris,
1967/8; U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Ab¬
stract of the U.S., 1962, 1964, 1967, 1971, and 1974.
This may be explained by the fact that the growth rate
of the U.S. government R&D funding has decreased from 9 per
cent to one per cent annually since 1966 while that of
France experienced about 13 per cent and West Germany 30
per cent.23 (Table 22 exhibits the trend of the research and
development of key countries)

From this table we can see

that France with the largest proportion of public funding
on R6eD achieved significant increment in productivity.
West Germany attained a better performance with least pub-
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lie commitment due to the efficient private sector.
theless,

Never¬

this is because of the more rapid increase in pri¬

vate funding on R&D rather than a decrease in public funding.
Table 23 conforms a consistent relationship between
the growth rate of R&D expenditure and that of productivity
in four countries.

R&D elasticity was used as a measure

of efficiency by dividing the former by the latter during
the nine year period.

Understandably, the U.S. being the

explorer in many frontier areas has low elasticity and the
West Germany the highest benefiting from already proven
technology.

The unusually low figure for France, however,

is due to a sudden spurt of R&D expenditure in the last
few years of the period.

Table 23.

(See Table 22)

Average Annual Growth Rates of R&D Expenditure
and Productivity in Four Countries
1963 to 1972
(in Percentage)
U.S.

Year

Britain

France

West Germany

R&D

5.9

3.0

16.5

11.3

Productivity

6.5

4.5

7.5

19.5

R&D Elasticity

1.10

1.50

0.45

1.73

Sources: Compiled from U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1962, 1964, 1967~j 1971,
and 1974; Interavia, May 1969, December 1970, May
1971, July 1972, June 1975; Science Policy News,
January 1970; Science News 1970; Aerospace Facts
and Figures, 1975.
As the productivity of the U.S. aerospace industry de-
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dined relative to the European countries, the U.S. marketshare of the world market declined.

In 1960, the U.S. ac¬

counted for 86 per cent of the total market.

(See Table 24)

If the projections are realized, that share will drop
below 60 per cent by 1985.
marketshare

At the same time, the European

would increase from 11 per cent of the total

market of $18.4 billion in 1960 to 31 per cent of $52 billion in 1985.24
Table 24.

World Market for Aerospace Products
1960 to 1985
Total Market
($ billion)

Year

U.S. Marketshare (%)

European Marketshare (%)

1960

18.4

86

11

1964

23.1

82

14

19 70

27.9

80

15

1975

35.3

68

25

1980(a)

45.4

65

27

1985(a)

52.0

60

31

Source: Aviation Week and Space Technology, New York, McGraw
Hill Co., June 6, 1977, pp. 82-83.
(a) Market Projection Figures
This implies that the European aerospace industry does
not necessarily conform itself to comparative advantage
theory in setting a developmental strategy.

This is so be¬

cause the comparative advantage itself is not a key element
of foreign trade nor an active factor in the economic beha¬
vior of both the government and the industry.

It is simply
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a symptom and a result of the economic and political reali¬
ties.

Only real factors

(public policy and the industry's

creative responses in this case)
and thus the symptoms.

can change the realities

Although there seems to be some

relationship between the symptoms and the concerned pheno¬
mena,

this is only so on the surface.

The above observa¬

tion does not necessarily apply to every industry nor to
every economy.

But this has been so in the case of the

aerospace industries in the U.S. and Western Europe.

The

argument, presumably, may be extended to other countries
with sufficient skilled manpower and firm determination
to develop their own high-technology industrial base.

4.

GOVERNMENT FINANCING AND TAX POLICY

Traditionally,
for a corporation;

there are four ways to raise capital
retained earnings, debt financing, equity

financing, and depreciation allowance.
ever,

Profit levels, how¬

direct all of these in one fashion or another,

since

both the cost of capital and the size of capital which the
corporation can raise directly or indirectly depends upon
profit.

In the case of the aerospace industry, the profit

level is determined by public policy in various ways since
an appreciable portion of sales are generated by the govern¬
ment; while still more of the non-governmental sales,

such

as the military aerospace exports, are directed by govern-
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ment.

(See Table 25)

Therefore profit policy set by the

government affects cost of the capital so profoundly that
it does not make any sense at all to look into the indus¬
try’s behavior without looking into this matter.
Table 25.

Sales of Major U.S. Aerospace Companies by
Customer
1950 to 1975
Billions of Dollars
(Percentage in Parenthesis)

Year

Total

1950
1955

3.1
12.4

2. 6 (84)
10. 5 (85)

0.5
1.9

1961
1965

14.9
17.0

11. 8 (79)
12. 5 (74)

3.2 (21)
4.5 (26)

1970
1975

24.8
29.2

16. 4 (66)
17. 2 (59)

8.3 (34)
12.0 (41)

U.S. Government

Other
(16)
(15)

Sources: Bureau of the Census, Current Industrial Reports,
Series MO 37D; Aerospace Industries Association of
America, Aerospace Facts and Figures,1976/1977,
Washington, D. C. , 1977.
In this regard contrasting features of the profit policy
of the U.S.

and that of Britain offers outstanding opportut

nity to assess the impact of public policy on corporate fi¬
nance and subsequential performance.

Overall prospects of

profit for the U.S. aerospace industry have been more favor¬
able than that of the European countries, particularly of
Britain.

This stems from contrasting approaches used to

determine contractor fees for negotiated defense contracts.
The U.S. system bases the target contract profit on the char¬
acteristics of the inputs furnished by the contractor and
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other features of the contract.

On the other hand,

the Bri¬

tish system computes the contract profit rate according to
return on assets,

adjusted for other features of the contract.

These two different policies of profit computation have a
crucial impact on entrepreneurial motivations.

a.

THE U.S. PROFIT SYSTEM

The U.S. system offers flexibility of differentiating
among different types of inputs.

Thus through its profit

policy the government can encourage contractors to acquire
certain skills and capabilities and discourage them from ac¬
quiring others.

For instance, the contractor can improve

profit by performing tasks which require relatively large
amounts of engineering work.

In the U.S.
two steps.

25

system, profit determination consists of

First,

the target cost of the contract is deter¬

mined by applying cost analysis principles.

Second,

a tar¬

get profit rate is determined by multiplying these two fig¬
ures .
The base to which the profit rate is applied is obtain¬
ed by estimating the expenditures required to fulfill the
contract.

Direct costs have to be both "allocable" and

"allowable," as defined in the Armed Service Procurement Re¬
gulation. (ASPR)
overhead rate.

Indirect cost is reimbursed based on a set
This determination of the target cost is
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governed by a number of complex and controversial cost prin¬
ciples, which sometimes exclude from allowable cost outlays
commonly regarded as ordinary business expenses.
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The profit rate applied to the cost base is determined
by a system called weighted guidelines(WGL).

The first com¬

ponent of the profit rate is based upon the characteristics
of the inputs which the contractor furnishes.

The formal

designation of this component is Contractor's Input to Total
Performance.

This portion of the fee is designed to dis¬

courage profit pyramiding, which is earning excessive profits
through the cost of items produced hy subcontractors.

It

also encourages firms which use engineering labor and other
specialized skills.

Accordingly,

the Input to Total Perfor¬

mance factor results in a higher profit rate for firms engaged
in sophisticated in-house activities relative to firms doing
a large amount of subcontracting.
The second component of the profit rate consists of sev¬
eral factors

(or below the line factors) that reflect the

degree of cost risk,

the past performance of the contractor

and the "selected factors."

The most important factor is

the degree to which the Contractor relies on Government faci¬
lities.
mance,
gories;

To compute the Contractor's Input to Total Perfor¬
the total estimated cost is divided into eight catadirect material, engineering labor, manufacturing

labor, special tooling, engineering burden, manufacturing
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burden, general and administrative expenses,

and royalties.

The ASPR specifies a range of profit rates for each factor.
The contracting officer selects from within these ranges spe¬
cific profit rates.

The rates are multiplied by the esti¬

mated cost allocated to each expense category.

This multi¬

plication yields a profit on each expense category.

Adding

up this profit and dividing it by the estimated cost yields
the basic target rate up to a maximum of 7 per cent.
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This rate is then modified by the '’below the line" fac¬
tors.

The risk factor depends upon the type of contract,

the reliability of the cost estimate, and the difficulty of
the contractor's task.

Put differently, risk,

for profit

purposes, is essentially defined by the pricing arrangement
and the method of source selection.

Allowance for the past

performance is designed as an incentive for efficiency and
high quality work.

It can increase or decrease the profit

rate by as much as two percentage points.
The "selected factors" can result in the subtraction of
up to two per cent from the profit rate.

The most important

consideration here is the amount of Government furnished fa¬
cilities and equipment used.

A firm with no such facilities

would have no subtraction, but a firm with extensive use of
3uch facilities could penalized by the subtraction of two
percentage points.
inve s t.

Thi3 is used to motivate contractors to
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The main determinant of the profit rate in the U.S.
system is the nature of the underlying cost base.

Thus a

firm with substantial inputs of direct labor, particularly
engineering labor, will have very high target profit rate.
On the other hand, a very capital intensive firm using small
amounts of "unsophisticated" labor skills will have relative¬
ly low profit rates.

Converting these rates of return on

the cost base to rates of return on assets, the former firm
will earn a higher profit rate on its investment compared to
the latter firm.

However, the Department of Defense(DOD) policy is not
the only factor which affects the profit level of the indus¬
try.

The Renegotiation Eoard which was originally establish

ed as an independent agency to control general price-wageprofit levels during the World War II is directly responsible
Renegotiation has been maintained on the rationale that it
permits contract prices to reflect the change in any pro¬
duction condition which was unforeseen when the contract
was negotiated.

Thus the Renegotiation Board is primarily

engaged in backstopping the contracting process by providing
an opportunity for a retrospective view of the costs upon
which the prices were based.

The Board, nevertheless

makes no attemptes to determine an appropriate rate of re¬
turn on capital.

It simply judges the application of each

of the statutory factors enumerated above to the facts of
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the following cases:
1. reasonableness of costs and profits,
2. net worth, particularly the amount of Government fur¬
nished plant and equipment,
3. risk assumed,
4. nature and extent of contribution to the defense ef¬
fort ,
5.

character of the business,

6.

other factors the Board may adopt.
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Therefore, DOD procurement policy remains the main frame¬
work of computing profits which affects the financial struc¬
ture of the U.S. aerospace industry directly and indirectly.

The U.S. system, however,

does have some weak points.

One of these is the inadequate, and indirect treatment of
the contractor's investment.

The only explicit allowance

for the contractors investment is the penalty leveled again¬
st firms utilizing Government-furnished facilities.

Profit

policy does not distinguish between the capital intensive
work and the labor intensive work.

Thus the U.S.

discriminates aginst capital intensive firms.

system

This has

not been much of a problem for the large aerospace companies
since they are all relatively labor intensive.
Many of the subcontractors which are classified
manufacturing industries, however,

(See Table 26;
as

other

are engaged more in manu¬

facturing than in assembly and integration, and are therefore
more capital intensive.
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Table 26

Assets Per Employee Among the 500 Largest
Industries in the U.S.

THE INDUSTRY MEDIANS
Petroleum refining
Mining, crude-oil production
Broadcasting, motion-picture
Beverages
Tobacco
Metal manufacturing
Chemicals
Paper,fiber, and wood products
Pharmaceuticals
Soaps, cosmetics
Publishing, printing
Food
Industrial and farm equipment
Shipbuilding, railroad equipment
Glass, concrete, abrasives, gypsum
Metal products
Office equipment
Motor vehicles
Rubber, plastic products
Scientific equipment
Electronics, appliances
#Aerospace
Textiles, vinylflooring
Apparel
Toys, sporting goods
Leather
Furniture
Jewelry, silverware
All Industries
Source: Fortune, May,

$196,927
114,898
70,434
69,026
65,298
57,272
54,212
47,587
40,923
36,885
36,468
36,463
33,893
33,705
32,780
30,625
30,112
29,754
28,913
28,838
25,239
23,954
21,254
14,991
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.,
37,939

1976.

The administrative advantage of the U.S.

system is that

the government can avoid explicit decisions about the net
profit requirements for specific firms.

This, however, ne¬

cessarily works aginst economizing the cost of defense con¬
tracts.

Nevertheless,

from the industry's point of vieT.v

this is the most advantageous for capital accumulation.
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b.

THE BRITISH PROFIT SYSTEM

The British defense profit system regulates the rate of
return on the original cost of assets in a manner similar to
that of the public utility and transportation industries in
the U.S.

This system requires three separate decision sta¬

ges :
1.

the composition and value of the asset base,

2.

the appropriate target rate of return to be applied
to the asset base,

3.

a set of contract profit rates that could yield the
required profit.

The British system uses an original cost, less deprecia¬
tion approach.
ly excluded.

However,

certain corporate assets are usual¬

For instance, good will, investments in stocks

and securities, excess cash,

and loans to subsidiaries are

excluded from the computation of the assets base.

30

In converting target profits of investment to a target
rate of return on contracts,
firms as a single unit.

the British system views the

Thus the precise rate of return on

the capital devoted to any particular contract is not calcu¬
lated.

Then turnover ratio is obtained through dividing

the contractor’s assets, by total cost of production for the
previous year.

Multiplying this by the target rate of re¬

turn on assets yields a target rate of return on contract
cost without determining an asset rate base for each con-
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Since the capital intensities of various projects differ,
a firm will make more than the target rate of return on some
assets and less on others.

Also, if the turnover ratio in

a given year differs from that of the previous year, then
the actual rate of return on assets will differ from the tar¬
get.

If the firm has more sales than expected, the actual

rate of return on assets will be greater than anticipated.
If turnover is less, profits will also be less.
words,

In other

the British profit system is based on computation of

a turnover ratio and the actual profits will depend upon the
degree to which the sales expectations are fulfilled.

Thus

actual profit tends to diverge from the target rate of return.
This also makes profit rates of the British industry lower
than that of its U.S. counterpart since the aerospace indus¬
try is not a capital-intensive industry.

Under the British system,

(See Table 27)

the industry is encouraged to

invest more plant and equipment than the U.S. system which
relates fee to the total cost.

On the other hand, the U.S.

aerospace industry has more room for profit since the target
profit is computed on the basis of cost which is easier to
inflate than asset base.
of the U.S.

Consequently, overall profit rate

industry has always been better than that of Bri¬

tish industry.

Table 28 exhibits the trend of the aerospace

industry's rate of return on net assets in both countries.
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Table 27

The Aerospace Industry's Rate of Return on
Net Assets in the U.S. and Britain
(in percentage)
Year

U.S.

1956
1957
1958
1959
1960

35
31
23
14
10

19
16
13
11
9

1961
1962
1963
1964
1965

14
18
17
18
23

6
7
9
6
N. A.

1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

20
16
18
13
7

N. A.
N. A.
N. A.
N. A
N. A.

1971
1972
1973
1974
1975

6
9
11
11
10

N. A.
N. A
N. A
N. A.
N. A.

1976

13

N. A.

Britain

Sources: Compiled from Aerospace Industries Assciation of
America; Aerospace Facts and Figures, Washington D C
1963, pp. 80-3, 1968, pp. 92-93, 1972/1973, pp. 104105, 1977/1978, pp. 131-132, and Plowden Report, Lon¬
don, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1965.*
No comprehensive industrial data are available for British
industry since Plowden Report came out in 1965.

This low profit rate along with small procurement made
the British industry incapable of accumulating the necessary
capital base.

Ultimately,

this led to the nationalization

140

of the British aerospace industry.

Reflecting back, it

would have been much wiser and economical for Britain to
allow sufficient profit in order to develop its aerospace
industry internationally rather than to make it so lean that
ultimately the government would have to bear the whole bur¬
den.

5.

EXPORT POLICY AND EXPORT PATTERN

Government influence upon the export promotion of aero¬
space products is something of a myth throughout recent his¬
tory.

However, we can gain some understanding of its essence

through a few publicized facts.

Traditionally,

the U.S. has considered Latin America as

the arena of its influence.
port Kfir (Young Lion)
was one of anger.

Thus, when Israel tried to ex¬

to Equador,

The U.S.

the U.S. official reaction

turned it down on the basis of

an agreement on the sales of supplies
General Electric J-79 engines)
sion from the U.S.
Furthermore,

(particularly that of

that Israel required permis-

in order to export to a third country.

33

the U.S. began to treat Israel Aircraft Indus¬

tries (IAI) as a tough, prospective competitor in the world
market.
U.S.

Accordingly, getting license arrangements with the

34
aerospace companies became extremely difficult."
Sensing the international position of the U.S.,

the

British government has intentionally avoided confronting
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the U.S.

aerospace industry in this sensitive market.

In

any case, after World War II, Britain was not in a position
to vex the U.S. by exporting arms to the Third World.
same was true of West Germany, Japan, and Italy.

The

France un¬

der General de Gaulle was probably the only country which
was able and willing to do so.

This left the U.S. aerospace

in a virtually monopolistic position in the world market for
military aircraft.

With the Kennedy Administration,

in 1961, the Pentagon

was swiftly changed by the personality of the new Secretary
of Defense, Robert McNamara.

Ke, with a Ford Motor back¬

ground, was determined to run the Pentagon in a business-like
fashion.

So he attempted to standardize weapon systems not

only domestically but internationally, in particular among
the NATO countries.

For instance,

the NATO countries employ¬

ed fourteen different types of small-arms and ammunition,
while the Communist block used one.

In the process of

standardization, he insisted on unifying the system with
that of the U.S.

since American arms were the most advanced

and the most economical with the biggest domestic market.
Second,

the Kennedy Administration was deeply worried

about the deficit in balance of payments, which amounted to
$3 billion.36

At the beginning of his presidency, Kennedy

told the NATO allies that they must pay for their arms.
During 1961 a task force headed by McGeorge Bundy and Paul
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Nitze investigated the problem and decided to set up a spe¬
cial group inside the Pentagon.

It was called the Interna¬

tional Logistics Negotiations(ILN), but it was actually an
organization for selling arms.

37

It was now that the government was urging the industry
to sell.

The ILN, persuaded foreign governments to buy

arms, and the U.S.

companies to sell them.

Soon the U.S.

was selling an average of $2 billion in arms each year.
This was more than twice the value of the arms given away in
grant aid.

38

The aerospace products amounted to more than

60 per cent of the total arms exports.
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The Northrop Corporation is a good example of direct
governmental support for export promotion.

In 1968, its

contract to produce T-38 trainers for the Air Force was about
to expire.

The Freedom Fighter, a fighter version of T-38,

was becoming harder and harder to market overseas due to its
limited range and speed.

By some means,

Congressman Rivers,

then chairman of the House Armed Service Committee, persuad¬
ed the Pentagon and Congress to appropriate $28 million for
improving the fighter.^

Furthermore, the Pentagon placed

an initial order of 325 F-5Es or International Fighters in
order to set the project in motion.
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Gradually this new improved fighter gained the reputa¬
tion of being the most economical fighter in the world.

It
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is reputed to be a match for a MIG-21 in combat.

Yet, with

a fly-away cost of $2 million, it costs less than any other
/ 0

modem supersonic fighter in the world.

International

Fighters have been exported to twenty-two countries including
Switzerland, Canada, Korea,

and Norway.

In Washington it

was regarded as a key instrument of foreign policy providing
links with the Third World.

It has thus contributed $2 bil¬

lion to the U,S, balance of payments.

So the F-5E became

the most successful arms export for the U.S.

since McNamara's

doctrines of selling arms rather than giving arms was initiat-

If the case of Northrop was due to the success of the
overt governmental promotion of an aerospace export,

then

the case of General Dynamics is a brutal battle among the
Allies,

in particular, the U.S. and France.

This stems

from the urgent need for standardization in employing a re¬
placement for the F-104,

the Starfightcr.

However, this

time the role of the government was more active and the pressures and lobbying came as much from diplomatic and defense
officials as from the companies.

The concerned governments

decided that the matter was too crucial to be left to the
hands of the aerospace tycoons because the choice would af¬
fect not only the future of aerospace industry, but the poli¬
tical character and the development of Europe.

Originally,

there were six contenders:

BAC, Hawker
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Siddeley, French Dassault, Swedish Saab, Northrop,
Dynamics.

and General

But soon it became apparant that this was a battle

between Dassault and General Dynamics as it was finally re¬
warded the U.S. Air Force contract in 1975 with the eventual
prospect of orders for 650 planes.^

General Dynamics, however, was slow in getting into the
international market.

Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, de¬

termined to press for standardization, urged the company into
battle, promising the full weight of the Pentagon behind
them.^

For the first five months of 1975 the contest for

the NATO plane was at its peak.

The Swedes offered tempting

offset agreements and the French Government suggested the
future integration of the whole European aircraft industry.
The French government also assured other countries that France
would be thoroughly integrated with NATO.
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General Dynamics promised the Europeans a share in the
profits and production of any planes sold to the Third World,
which they estimated to be about two thousand planes.
the same time,

At

the Pentagon overtly supported the company

by reminding them that unless NATO is standardized, the fu¬
ture of the U.S.

defense of Europe would be in jeopardy.

President Ford personally discussed the matter with Belgian
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Prime Minister when he visited Brussels for a NATO meeting.
At last,

in May 1975, Holland, Norway, and Denmark agreed

to order the General Dynamics'

F-16.

The Belgians were still
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split because of the delicate political situation existing
between the Walloons and the Flemish.

Then Schlesinger in¬

vited the Belgian Minister of Defense to Washington and point¬
ed out that the four countries would probably get back their
whole initial investment by producing more planes for the
Third World.

He also offered to buy $30

million worth of

Belgian machine-guns, which are made in French speaking Bel¬
gium. ^

Finally on June 6, Belgium announced the decision

to buy the American plane.

The Europeans paid for American

technology, contributing as much as half-a-million dollars
to the development costs of each plane.
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These anecdotal examples demonstrated the importance of
the role of the government in exporting aerospace products.
This does not mean, of course,
tors are not important.

that the technological fac¬

Nevertheless, the influence of

public policy overshadows the remaining factors which may
have some influence over the decision making.

In the real

world of politics, some influence may be only as good as
none.
This active export policy along with other public policy
changed the pattern of the U.S.

foreign trade substantially

during the last half a century.

Table 28 exhibits the ex¬

port structure of key commodities in the U.S.
iod from 1910 to 1975.

during the per

In the pre World War I period, cot¬

ton export comprises 58 per cent of the total export of eight
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Table 28.

Year

U.S. Export Pattern of Key Commodities
1910 to 1975
Millions of Dollars
(Percentage in Parentheses)

Raw
Petro¬ Iron Aero¬
Wheat Meat Auto
Total
Cotton Tobacco wneaE
leum
Steel space
450
(58)

38
(5)

48
(6)

62
(8)

11
107
(1) (14)

60
(8)

1136
(31)

245
(7)

597
(2)

279
(8)

303
593
(8) (16)

498
(14)

1930

497
(29)

145
(8)

88
(5)

66
(4)

279
(16)

495
(29)

139
(8)

9
(0.5)

1,713
(100)

1940

213
(13)

44
(3)

11
(1)

22
(1)

254
310
(15) (18)

516
(31)

312
(19)

1,682
(100)

1950

1024
(28)

250
(7)

405
(ID

43
(1)

723 499
(20) (14)

472
(13)

242
(7)

3,653
(100)

1960

980
(16)

379
(6)

1029
(17)

84
(1)

1270
(21)

463
(8)

635
(10)

1330
(22)

6,175
(100)

1970

372
(4)

481
(5)

1112
(11)

147
(1)

3245
(31)

433
(5)

1188
(11)

3397 10,430
(100)
(33)

1975

991
(4)

853
(3)

5293
(20)

491
(2)

8192
(30)

907
(3)

2382
(9)

7792 26,901
(100)
(29)

1910
1920

776
(100)

-

1
-

3,652
(100)

Sources: Compiled from U.S. Department or Commerce, Bureau
of Census, Historical'Statistics of the U.S., Colonial times to 1958, 'Washington, D.C. , i960, p. 5^6;
Ibid. 1975. and Statistical Abstract of the U.S.,
Washington, D.C.” 1976.
key commodities.

3ut in 1975, it consists cr only 4 per

cent of the total while aerospace export ^r.crsiSec --—
less than 1 per cent in 1920 to 29 per cent or the total.
One thing to note is that real price cr cotton steac../
decreased during the period.

Thus it the -.S.

- - -/n

cotton extort which was comparatively advantageous, i —
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foreign exchange earning power would have been greatly de¬
teriorated.

From the British point of view,

been much better if the U.S.

it would have

concentrate on agricultural

production with its vast fertile land while she specialize
on high technology - high unit value industry such as aero¬
space.

Considering this,

it is

not surprising that the

most ardent advocates of comparative advantage theory have
been produced by Britain.

6.

GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT POLICY

Of the many factors which differentiated the perfor¬
mance of the U.S.

aerospace industry from that of its Bri¬

tish counterpart is the size of government procurement.
Size is a crucial factor in improving productivity and cost
reduction in the industry because of its consequential
learning effect.

The phenomenon of learning in the manu¬

facturing process first attracted serious attention during
World War II.^

Since then it has become an increasingly

familiar concept particularly in the aircraft industry.

In any type of work as workers become familiar with
the peculiarities of a new job through repetition,
they take to accomplish it progressively decreases.

the time
Pro¬

gressive improvement in method also contributes to cost re¬
duction.

Thus a learning curve can be derived by plotting

the man-hours required to produce a unit against quantity.
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It shows that for each increment in the quantity produced,
there is a corresponding percentage reduction in man-hours
per unit.

For a typical airframe construction,

first unit requires 1,000 man-hours,

if the

the time required by

successive units will be as shown in the following table.

Table 29

Kan-hours on a Typical Learning Curve
in Aircraft Production

Number of unit

Man-hours per unit

Cumulative average
Man-hours per unit

1
2
3
4
5

1,000
800
702
640
596

1,000
900
834
785
748

10
20
30
40
50

477
381
335
305
284

631
524
467
430
402

100
200
300
400
500

227
182
159
145
135

327
264
232
212
198

1000

108

159

Source: Ministry of Technology, Productivity of the National
Aircraft Effort, London, Her Majesty's Stationery
Office, 1969.

As man-hours for successive units decrease,
the average hours for all units produced,
Table 29 shows.

so does

as column 3 of

The decrease in the unit and cumulative

average man-hours is most notable in the smaller units

i
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stages.

As the number of units produced increases the

productivity improvement gradually becomes smaller and
smaller.

This is shown more clearly when the learning

curve is plotted as in Graph 3.

Consequently, when we

compare productivity it makes a great difference whether
we are referring to the production of 10 units or 1,000
units.

With regard to the number of units produced the U.S.
and Britain are incomparable.

In 1976 the U.S.

aerospace

industry delivered 16,605 units while its British counter¬
part delivered only 353 units.^

This is mainly due to

the contrasting size of defense procurement of the respec¬
tive governments.

As the following Table 30 indicates,

the defense budget of British government is a fraction of
that of the U.S.

However,

it should be stressed that there

are at least three different official sources of statistics
on the aerospace industry and all three are consistently
inconsistent to each other.
tor,

The three are Business Moni¬

a British government statistical publication,

Depart¬

ment of Industry and the Society of British Aerospace Com¬
panies.

What is more,

the Annual Abstract of Statistics,

published by Central Statistics Office,
the situation.

Thus,

the two extremeties was

further confuses

as a compromise median number of
chosen as a representative number.

From Table 30 we can see that the size of British

Graph 3.

Learning Curve in Aircraft Production

Cumulative
Average
Man-hours

lOOO

800

600

-

400

-

200

200

400
Number of Units

Source: Ministry of Technology, Productivity of the National
Aircraft Effort, London: Her Maiesty s Stationery
Office, 1969”
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Table 30.

The Proportion of Government Procurement to the
Aerospace Industry Sales in the U.S. and Britain
1960 to 1976
(Billions of Dollars)
Britain

Year

U.S.

Industry Government
Sales Procurement

%

Industry Government
Sales Procurement

%

British/
U.S. Pro¬
curement
(%)

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964

1.2
1.4
1.3
1.3
1.4

.5
.6
.6
.6
.6

44
43
43
47
43

17.3
18.0
19.2
20.1
20.6

13.6
14.5
15.7
16.8
17.9

79
81
82
84
87

4
4
4
4
3

1965
1966
1967
1968
1969

1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.7

.6
.6
.5
.5
.4

38
35
32
31
26

20.7
24.6
27.3
29.0
26.1

15.9
18.3
20.1
21.4
20.5

77
74
74
74
79

4
3
3
2
2

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974

2.2
2.5
3.0
3.8
N. A.

.4
N. A.
.9
1.3
1.8

19
N.A.
29
N.A.
N.A.

24.9
22.2
22.8
24.8
26.4

18.7
15.3
15.9
15.3
15.2

75
69
70
62
58

2
N.A.
5
8
12

1975
1976

N. A.
N. A

1.9
2.4

N.A.
N.A.

28.4
29.3

15.9
16.2

56
55

12
15

Sources:

Compiled from British Industry Today; Aerospace,
London, 1972, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, An¬
nual Abstract of Statistics, 1976, Interavia, September 1975, and Aerospace Industries Association
of America, Aerospace Facts and figures, 1977/78 ,
Washington, D.C., 1977.

•

government’s procurement is about 3 per cent of that of
the U.S.

government.

1970's since the U.S.
decreased.

However,

this has changed in the

government procurement substantially

It is also noticeable that the U.S.

aerospace

industry is twice as dependent upon government procurement
as the British aerospace industry.

This indicates that
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Table 31.

The Proportion of Export to the Industry Sales
of the U.S. and British Aerospace Industries
1960 to 1975
(Billions of Dollars)
U.S.

Britain
(A) Ex¬
ports

Export/
Total
Sales<%) Sales

A/B
(%)

(B) Ex¬
Export/
ports
Sales(%)

Year

Total
Sales

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964

1.2
1.4
1.3
1.3
1.4

.4
.4
.3
.2
.2

34
31
26
20
18

17.3
18.0
19.2
20.1
20.6

1.7
1.7
1.9
1.6
1.6

10
9
10
8
8

23
25
17
15
15

1965
1966
1967
1968
1969

1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.7

.4
.5
.5
.7
.7

26
32
30
45
44

20.7
24.6
27.3
29.0
26.1

1.6
1.7
2.2
3.0
3.1

8
7
8
10
12

26
31
22
23
24

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974

2.2
2.5
3.0
3.8
N. A.

.7
.9
1.1
1.5
1.8

31
34
37
39
N.A.

24.9
22.2
22.8
24.8
26.4

3.4
4.2
3.8
5.1
7.1

14
19
17
21
27

20
20
29
30
26

1975
1976

N. A.
N. A.

2.3
N.A.

N.A.
N.A.

8.4
29.3

7.8
7.9

27
27

30
N.A.

Sources: British Industry Today; Aerospace, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1960-1976.Annual Abstract of
Statistics, London, Her Majesty's Stationary Office,
1960-1976, Interavia, September 1976, Aerospace In¬
dustries Association of America, Aerospace Facts and
Figures , 1977/1978 , Washington, D.C~T, 1977 .

the British industry depends more upon the exports.

Table

31 shows the proportion of exports to the industry sales of
both countries.

This demonstrates that the Britain has

been forced to sell arms to arm her own forces because of
the small size of government procurement.
indicates that the U.S.

Table 31 also

aerospace industry is increasingly
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dependent upon export sales while the proportion of govern¬
ment procurement is steadily decreasing as was indicated in
the previous table 30.

At the same time,

the relative mar¬

ket position of the British aerospace industry compared to
the U.S.

aerospace industry has improved.
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CHAPTER V.
1.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

OBJECTIVE OF STUDY

The Heckscher-Ohlin theorem assumes that comparative
advantage causes and determines the pattern of international
trade.^

But is comparative advantage really a cause of

international trade or is it just a result of it?

Or

are both international trade and comparative advantage the
result of something else?

Although this causality has

been taken for granted due to its intuitive appeal,

the

implication of the causation can hardly be exaggerated
since the future pattern of trade and the developmental
strategy of any economy will depend upon it.

In a state of global inflation,

only an industry with

the inelastic price elasticity of demand for its product
can raise the relative price level of its product suffi¬
ciently to improve the real income.

Therefore,

only an

economy with a high technology - high unit value industrial
base can better the income and employment levels of its
people through export expansion.

Accordingly,

this sense,

'engine of growth'.

can export be truly an

The theory of comparative advantage, however,

only in

2

directs an

economy to concentrate on an industry which it is relatively
best at.

This

leads to wider gap between a developed eco¬

nomy and a developing one by further reinforcing the state
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of comparative advantage.

If comparative advantage theory were right,

the prewar

U.S. would have been better off by remaining a predominantly
agricultural economy indefinitely while Britain concentrated
on technology-intensive industry such as the aircraft indus¬
try.

But the U.S.

course.

aircraft industry took the opposite

This diffiance of the U.S.

aircraft industry and

government turned out to be the cornerstone of American
leadership in the postwar period.

Again Europe in the

1970’s took a similar action in the development of the aero¬
space industry.

All these contradict what comparative

advantage theory has put forth for the last two centuries.

The basic objective of this study is to critically
examine the export pattern of the U.S.

aerospace industry

in light of international trade theory to substantiate that
the real driving force of international trade is not com¬
parative advantage but the concerted will of entrepreneur
and government to expand the market,

thus improving the

productivity and the income level.

In the process of de¬

termining what to export,

an industry with a high potentia¬

lity of earning power and a high strategic value in a politicoeconomic

sense,

has a high priority.

Once the export is determined,

the state of compara¬

tive advantage is changeable through various public poli¬
cies.

This is why comparative advantage seems to dictate
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the pattern of international trade on the surface.
ality, however,

In re¬

comparative advantage is only a result of

the interaction between public policy and the entrepreneurs
adaptability to a changing economic reality.

In a passive economy dominated by the trade of crude
commodities, comparative advantage seems especially fixed
and vested.

But in the complex world we live in today,

this is more determined by public policy than a passive
factor endowment which was stressed so much by the compara¬
tive advantage advocates since factor endowment can be
changed by public policy.

For example, a $20 million jet

fighter is nothing more than seven tons of steel and alu¬
minum plates which would probably cost less than one thou¬
sandth of its price.

Would natural factor endowments af¬

fect the state of comparative advantage?

Even other fac¬

tors such as capital and skilled labor are changeable by
the public policies of resource allocation and systematic
training.

A generally capital deficient economy can have

a capital intensive industrial base by concentrating its
resources.

Thus it does not make any more sense to analy¬

ze international trade through factor endowments than to
judge a human being in terms of his height.
All these factors lead to the hypotheses of this study
1.

The comparative advantage is not a factor which
is vested and fixed;
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2.

The state of comparative advantage is constantly
changed by the interaction of public policy and
the entrepreneurs'

adaptability to their changing

economic reality;
3.

Comparative advantage is not a sufficient driving
force of international trade but a necessary fac¬
tor resulting from exogeneous efforts;

4.

The active driving force of international trade
and the determinant of international trade pattern
are the wills of entrepreneurs and government to
improve the income and employment levels through
market expansion.

In order to substantiate these hypotheses, the growth
of the U.S. aerospace industry and its export pattern were
critically examined in conjunction with U.S. public policy.
By doing so this study explore the crucial role of the go¬
vernment in changing the state of comparative advantage be¬
tween the U.S.

2.

and British aerosapce industries.

REVIEW OF STUDY
In chapter two, three main lines of thought on inter¬

national trade were examined; protectionism, price theory,
and income theory.
ous school.

Protectionism is by no means a rigor¬

Yet its persistent influence on actual policy

making process,

suggests that it should not be ignored.
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However, the resulting high cost to an economy as a whole
in the long run makes it self-defeating.

Price theory begins with Adam Smith's absolute advan¬
tage theory.

But the real spurt was after the conception

of comparative advantage by Torrens and Ricardo.

This is

further refined by Heckscher and Ohlin into the factor en¬
dowment theory.

Samuelson and Meade expand Heckscher-Ohlin

theory into multi-dimensional model.

There are further re¬

finements of the price theory with the introduction of
technology, competition, transportation, and economies of
scale.

Nevertheless, price theory presents only a limited

scope of production and cost neglecting demand and income
sides.
Income theory is concerned with the multiplier-acceler¬
ator effects of income and the balance of trade effects gen¬
erated by exports.

This, however, was insufficient in ex¬

plaining the widening gap between the income level of a de¬
veloped economy and that of a developing one which is equally
or even more export-oriented than the former.

Thus income

theory was further ameliorated by the introduction of a
terms of trade factor.
Despite all these, contemporary international theory
lacks an explanation of the active cause of international
trade.

This is due to the fact that it deals with the
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symptoms rather than the actors in economic reality.
the real world, the true actor is Man himself.

In

Conse¬

quently, his value system, mentality, physical dimension,
and social institutions direct the destiny of the world he
lives in.

Eventually, these would extend into public po¬

licy ranging from foreign policy to tax policy.

These

policies constantly change the external factors of produc¬
tion and consumption.

This study has named this, the dy¬

namic externality theory.

Thus, no matter how difficult

it is to handle these factors, these must be included in
any viable theory.
In chapter three,

the growth of the U.S. aerospsce

industry from its birth to today was examined.

In every

stage of breakthrough, various policy measures implemented
by the government and the industry's adaptation to it was
closely examined.
In chapter four, the impact of public policy on the
exports of the aerosapce industry was analyzed from various
aspects: research and development, government financing and
tax, export,
purpose,

and government procurement policies.

For the

the industry data of the U.S. and the Western

Europe, especially that of the British aerospace industry
were widely used to do a comparative analysis.
From chapter two we learned that international trade
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theory is based upon comparative advantage.

However, this

case study suggests that both cost of production and demand,
in so far as aerospace industry is concerned, are essen¬
tially determined by public policy which is in return deter¬
mined by the interaction of the value system of people and
political institution.

As we saw production cost and

supply curves are dependent upon public expenditure for
research and development, tax policy, and government pro¬
curement.

At the same time demand itself is grossly de¬

termined by public policy since government procurement is
more than a half of the total industry sales and export is
also directed by the foreign and military policies of the
government.
A significant corollary of this is that when the U.S.
government supports research and development, and thus im¬
proves productivity,

the state comparative advantage of the

industry and export pattern are changed.

Likewise, if an

economy concentrate on the limited areas of the industry,
it by virtue of specialization may be in a position to com¬
pete with the other established economy as the U.S. did
successfully with Britain.

For example, Israel and Brazil

are becoming increasingly competitive in the world market.
Also the Western Europe increased its market share through
aggressive public procurement and R & D policies.
What they have in common with each other can be summed

164

up as following:
1.

Much of R & D activities are funded by the govern¬
ment.

In case of the U.S. aerospace industry, it

comes up to 79 per cent of the total R & D expendi¬
ture ;
2.

Government directly and indirectly finances the
industry by accelerated depreciation allowances,
stabilized profit level, government furnished
equipments and plants, and various incentive
measures for efficient contractors;

3.

Government covertly and overtly promotes the ex¬
port through the agencies of both foreign and mi¬
litary services.

This government promotion acti¬

vities intensify when the balance of payment posi¬
tion is worsen;
4.

The size of government procurement is crucial to
attain sufficient economies of scale,

since govern¬

ment procurement consists 60 to 80 per cent of the
total industry sales in case of the U.S.;
5.

Government guides the industry through long range
planning and coordination, thus keeping the indus¬
try as a whole viable.

Therefore, the active public policies of concerned govern¬
ment were indispensable in nurturing high technology indus¬
try such as aerospace industry.

Also each change in pub¬

lic policy may shift the whole external conditions of supply
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and demand.

Consequently, we should incorporate the

various aspects of public policy into our consideration
no matter how difficult it may be.

3.

CONCLUSION

The hypotheses of this study were:
1.

Comparative advantage is not a factor which is
vested and fixed;

2.

The state of comparative advantage is constantly
changed by the interaction of public policy and
the entrepreneurs'

adaptability to their changing

economic reality;
3.

Comparative advantage is not a sufficient driving
force of international trade but a necessary fac¬
tor resulting from exogenous efforts;

4.

The active driving force of international trade
and the determinant of international trade pattern
are the wills of entrepreneurs and government to
improve the income and employment levels through
market expansion.

The above hypotheses were substantiated by the study.
These may not be universal, but as far as the aerospace in¬
dustries in the U.S. and the Western Europe are concerned,
the above hypotheses are viable throughout seventy years of
their historv.

166

Also other hypotheses were suggested by the study.
Such hypotheses deserve further analysis:
1.

An oligopolistic industry regulated to secure the
public interest of a nation will affect the patterns
of foreign trade of potential competitors.

The

benefits of the trade may or may not be advanta¬
geous to the welfare of the affected countries;
2.

A small country, by selective specialization, may
successfully compete with a larger, better endowed
country, if the small country concentrates its
efforts in the limited segment of the market;

3.

The public policy of an exporting country may per¬
sistently affect production conditions of given
commodities regardless of the natural endowments
of the concerned country.

Such adverse effects

may result in institutionalized adjustments in
trading countries and may radically affect the con¬
ceptions of comparative advantage;
4.

Natural endowment as a basis for comparative ad¬
vantage may be grossly affected by the market
structure and also by access to government assis¬
tance .

5.

The benefits of international trade may, by the
public policy of a country,

°.ccure that country

to a greater degree than if comparative advantage
were the major determinant of trade.
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The implication of this study is that developmental
strategy of any economy needs not to be bounded by the
present state of comparative advantage.

This then opens

a whole new horizon of the theory of economic development.
Export to be a true

’engine of the growth'

export item

should be of high technology - high unit value industry.
Otherwise an economy heavily relying on low technology low unit value exports would do nothing but lower the liv¬
ing cost of other economies which concentrate on technology
intensive industries.

This does not mean that every economy should go into
every technology-intensive industry.

It must be extremely

careful in selecting an industry to which a whole economy
is to concentrate its resources and manpower.

The tactics

and criteria of the selection process, however, is beyond
the scope of this study.

4. AREAS OF FUTURE STUDY
This study is exploratory.

Consequently,

to gain

further insights into the implementable theory in interna¬
tional trade,

this should be extended over more external

factors which may be less significant than the ones includ¬
ed here.

Also quantification of variables wherever possi¬

ble with sensibly disaggregate data would enhance the appli
cability of the study to the policy making process.
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Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that every pro¬
spective variable must be scrutinized in light of causality.
Furthermore, business and economic sciences as a whole
should be more concerned with actors rather than symptoms.
In other words the economist should not be afraid of tack¬
ling the subjective issues involved with ideological contro¬
versies.

The development of business and economic sciences

is characterized by the quantification with value-free vari¬
ables.

This may be partially due to the boisterous idelo-

gical controversies during the last century.

Unlike the physical sciences, however, the social sci¬
ences cannot escape from subjectivity since the true actor
of social phenomena is Man himself.

Thus social scientists

should accept a value system as the backbone of the theoreti¬
cal framework no matter how difficult it is to comprehend.
Also institutions, as a social embodiment of Man himself,
should be considered as more of a living organism rather
than as of a indiscriminative mechanism of variables.

After all,'there is no permanent and universal rule
or value system in social phenomena, except self-preserva¬
tion and self-realization.
and universal.
human existence.

Only this must be permanent

Because the end of it will mean the end of
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